The phrase 'during the pleasure of the Governor' in Article 164(1) is constitutionally misleading. Critically examine the actual scope of gubernatorial discretion in the removal of a Chief Minister in light of judicial pronouncements.

Q. The phrase 'during the pleasure of the Governor' in Article 164(1) is constitutionally misleading. Critically examine the actual scope of gubernatorial discretion in the removal of a Chief Minister in light of judicial pronouncements. (15 marks, 250-350 words)

Article 164(1) provides that the Chief Minister is appointed by the Governor and Ministers "hold office during the pleasure of the Governor" [1]. Read literally, it suggests removal at will; read constitutionally, that pleasure is a formal expression of the Assembly's confidence — hence the phrase misleads, though discretion is not wholly absent.

Why the phrase is constitutionally misleading - Collective responsibility: Article 164(2) makes the Council of Ministers answerable to the Legislative Assembly [1]. The Governor's "pleasure" is therefore coextensive with the House's confidence, not an independent personal will. - S.R. Bommai (1994): a nine-judge Bench held that majority must be tested on the floor of the House, not through the Governor's subjective satisfaction or parades of legislators, and that Article 356 cannot bypass this test [2]. - Electoral defeat is not cessation: a Chief Minister whose party loses an election continues lawfully until resignation or an adverse floor test — the Election Commission's declaration is not the Legislature's verdict. - Sarkaria Commission urged Governors to invite the person most likely to command a majority, curbing arbitrary choice [3].

Where genuine discretion survives - In a hung Assembly, discretion at appointment is widest and least justiciable. - The Governor may summon the House and order a floor test under Article 174 — upheld in Shivraj Singh Chouhan (2020) — though Nabam Rebia (2016) restricts unilateral use. - If a defeated Chief Minister refuses to resign, the Governor may then withdraw pleasure. - Article 361 immunity, plus central appointment of Governors, allows partisan timing of floor tests even where the outcome is constitutionally fixed. - The Constitution (130th Amendment) Bill, 2025 would add automatic cessation after 31 days' detention — still pending, not law [4].

Thus the text is archaic, but judicial doctrine has converted "pleasure" into a duty to ascertain confidence. Codifying timelines for floor tests and caretaker conventions, along the lines commissions have recommended, would align Article 164(1) with the responsible-government principle it was always meant to serve.

(~325 words)

Sources: 1. The Constitution of India (Articles 163–164), Legislative Department, Government of India — text of Article 164(1) "pleasure" clause and Article 164(2) collective responsibility 2. S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994), Digi SCR, Supreme Court of India — floor test as the sole test of majority; limits on Article 356 3. Report of the Sarkaria Commission, Chapter IV: Role of the Governor, Inter-State Council Secretariat — guidelines on inviting the leader likely to command a majority 4. The Constitution (130th Amendment) Bill, 2025 (Removal of Ministers upon Detention), PRS Legislative Research — proposed automatic cessation of office on the 31st day of detention; pending before a Joint Committee