The POCSO Act, 2012, while designed to protect children, has increasingly become a tool for family vendettas against consensual adolescent relationships. Critically examine the need for a Romeo-Juliet clause in India, citing comparative international practice and constitutional principles.

The POCSO Act, 2012, raised the age of consent from 16 to 18 and made a minor's consent legally irrelevant [2]. In State of U.P. v. Anurudh (January 2026), the Supreme Court urged the Centre to insert a "Romeo-Juliet" (close-in-age) clause, noting that cases filed at the behest of a girl's family have become commonplace [1]. A calibrated exemption — not a rollback of the age of consent — is warranted.

The case for a close-in-age exemption

• Misuse as vendetta: the Court observed young boys languishing in jail in family-instigated cases, calling an instrument of noble intent a tool for revenge; the judgment was sent to the Union Law Secretary [1].
• Disproportionality: mandatory minimums of 3–7 years, rising to 20 years/death for victims below 12 after the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2018, leave courts no discretion to separate predation from adolescent intimacy [3].
• Constitutional principles: Article 21's guarantees of dignity, privacy and personal liberty (Puttaswamy, 2017) support limited adolescent autonomy; blanket criminalisation also strains proportionality under Article 14.
• Comparative practice: the USA, Canada, UK, Germany and South Africa retain close-in-age exemptions alongside strong child-protection regimes [2].
• Administrative gain: relieving backlogged POCSO Special Courts of consensual cases frees capacity for genuine abuse [4].

Countervailing concerns

• POCSO's absolute-liability design deters grooming and trafficking; a loosely drafted proviso could be pleaded by genuinely predatory adults.
• "Consent" at 15–17 is often shaped by coercion or economic dependence, and an exemption may weaken the deterrent effect on child marriage.
• It risks diluting protection for boys and transgender children, whom the Act covers equally [2].

The clause is therefore necessary but must be narrow: a defined age-gap (2–3 years), applicable only where no coercion, authority or trafficking is shown, with judicial discretion in sentencing rather than blanket immunity. Paired with adolescent health and legal-awareness services under the Ministry of Women and Child Development [4], such a reform would honour Article 15(3)'s protective mandate while restoring the law to its child-protective purpose.