Should the power to grant sanction under Section 17A of the PCA be vested in an independent authority like the Lokpal rather than the executive? Discuss with reference to constitutional principles of independence and accountability.

Q. Should the power to grant sanction under Section 17A of the PCA be vested in an independent authority like the Lokpal rather than the executive? Discuss with reference to constitutional principles of independence and accountability. (15 marks, 250-350 words)

Section 17A, inserted by the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act, 2018, bars any enquiry or investigation against a public servant for official acts without prior approval of the appointing government [1]. The Supreme Court's split verdict of January 2026 [2] has reopened the question of who should hold this gatekeeping power — and the balance of argument favours an independent authority.

Why executive sanction is constitutionally weak - Conflict of interest: the very government that appointed the officer decides whether an inquiry may begin [1], violating nemo judex in causa sua and inviting arbitrariness under Article 14. - Delay as denial: the three-month window, extendable by a month [1], allows evidence to dissipate and cases to close at the threshold. - Justice Nagarathna held the provision unconstitutional, as it forecloses even a bare inquiry and thereby shields the corrupt instead of protecting the honest [2].

The case for the Lokpal - The Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013 already creates an ombudsman insulated by collegium-based appointment and its own inquiry wing [3] — institutional independence Section 17A currently lacks. - Justice Viswanathan upheld the section but directed that sanction rest with the Lok Pal/Lok Ayukta, preceded by an independent examination of facts [2]. - The 2nd ARC's Ethics in Governance report similarly urged insulating anti-corruption machinery from executive control [4]. A reasoned, quasi-judicial order is also judicially reviewable — accountability without policy paralysis.

Caveats - Lokpal vacancies and uneven State Lokayuktas may simply relocate delay. - Genuine protection against vexatious complaints — the "play-it-safe syndrome" — must survive any transfer [2].

Vesting sanction in an independent ombudsman reconciles the two legitimate objects of the PCA: shielding bona fide decision-making while denying immunity to corruption. Adequate staffing, statutory timelines and mandatory recorded reasons should accompany the shift, so that the pending larger Bench's verdict advances both administrative morale and the rule of law.

(~315 words)

Sources: 1. The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (Act No. 49 of 1988), India Code — text of Section 17A, prior approval of appointing government, three-month timeline 2. SC delivers split verdict on validity of Section 17A of Prevention of Corruption Act, News on Air (Prasar Bharati), 14 Jan 2026 — split verdict; Nagarathna J. and Viswanathan J. opinions; Lokpal/Lokayukta direction 3. The Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013, India Code — independent anti-corruption ombudsman with its own inquiry machinery 4. Second ARC, Fourth Report: Ethics in Governance (2007), DARPG — recommendation to insulate anti-corruption institutions from executive control