Should the Presiding Officer continue to be the deciding authority on disqualification petitions under the Tenth Schedule? Critically examine in light of recent Maharashtra cases.

Q. Should the Presiding Officer continue to be the deciding authority on disqualification petitions under the Tenth Schedule? Critically examine in light of recent Maharashtra cases. (15 marks, 250-350 words)

The Tenth Schedule, inserted by the 52nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1985, makes the Presiding Officer of the House the sole adjudicator of disqualification petitions [1]. Maharashtra's recurring Legislative Council episodes suggest this design, though rooted in legislative autonomy, no longer secures the law's purpose.

The case for retaining the Presiding Officer - Separation of powers: disqualification is a matter of House discipline; internal adjudication protects the legislature from routine judicial supervision [1]. - Institutional expertise and speed: the Chair knows party positions, whips and floor conduct, and can in principle act faster than a court. - Judicial review already exists: Kihoto Hollohan (1992) confirmed that the Chair's decision is open to challenge in the higher judiciary, providing a corrective layer [1].

The case against — as Maharashtra shows - Partisanship of the office: the Presiding Officer is usually of the ruling party; the Supreme Court has noted a trend of Speakers acting against their duty of neutrality [2]. - No statutory time limit: the law prescribes no deadline, enabling indefinite delay; in one Manipur case proceedings were stalled for over three years, prompting the Court's three-month norm [2]. - Enforcement lag in practice: after Deputy Chairperson Neelam Gorhe crossed to the Shinde camp in 2023, the disqualification plea remained unresolved; the Sachin Ahir episode of 2026 repeated the pattern, the defector being elected Deputy Chairperson a day later [3]. - Loophole untested: members elected before a vertical party split claim continued membership of the "original" party, and no authority adjudicates this promptly [3].

The repetition of the same pattern in the same House marks a structural, not incidental, failure. The Dinesh Goswami Committee (1990) and the NCRWC both recommended shifting this power away from the Chair, and the Supreme Court has urged a permanent tribunal headed by a retired judge [2]. Vesting adjudication in such an independent body, with a binding time limit, would restore both the Chair's neutrality and the Tenth Schedule's original promise of stable, principled representation.

(~330 words)

Sources: 1. Explained: In Maharashtra drama, the key legal provision — anti-defection law, PRS Legislative Research — Presiding Officer as deciding authority, "voluntarily giving up membership", absence of a decision timeframe, judicial review under Kihoto Hollohan (1992) 2. The Anti-Defection Law That Does Not Aid Stability, PRS Legislative Research — Speakers' partisanship, Manipur three-year delay, Supreme Court's three-month norm and permanent tribunal proposal, Dinesh Goswami Committee and NCRWC recommendations 3. "A legislative tangle in Maharashtra", The Hindu, July 6, 2026 (link not verifiable) — Neelam Gorhe (2023) and Sachin Ahir (2026) Deputy Chairperson episodes, pre-split membership claim