The Supreme Court's practice of disposing of pleas as 'infructuous' without ruling on merits raises questions of judicial economy versus the need for legal clarity. Discuss with reference to sports governance disputes.

Q. The Supreme Court's practice of disposing of pleas as 'infructuous' without ruling on merits raises questions of judicial economy versus the need for legal clarity. Discuss with reference to sports governance disputes. (15 marks, 250-350 words)

A plea becomes infructuous when supervening events leave nothing live to adjudicate, and the court closes it without deciding the merits. In sports governance — where trials, tournaments and selection windows expire within days — this practice conserves judicial time but often leaves the underlying question of federation arbitrariness unsettled.

The sports-governance illustration - The Delhi High Court (22 May 2026) allowed Vinesh Phogat, returning from a maternity break, into Asian Games 2026 selection trials, holding the Wrestling Federation of India's policy exclusionary for lacking discretion for returning athletes [1]. - The Supreme Court permitted her participation in the trials held on 30–31 May 2026; once concluded, WFI's appeal was disposed of as infructuous, with the Bench neither affirming nor rejecting the High Court's findings [1].

The case for judicial economy - Sports disputes are time-critical: relief after the event is worthless, so the interim order effectively settles the real controversy. - Adjudicating a dead dispute approaches an advisory opinion, which constitutional practice avoids outside Article 143. - Bench time is conserved for live matters amid heavy pendency.

The cost to legal clarity - The substantive question — whether federations must build maternity and injury discretion into eligibility norms — remains unanswered, forcing the next athlete to relitigate afresh. - High Court findings left neither affirmed nor set aside create precedential uncertainty, weakening deterrence against arbitrary policy. - It rewards federations that run out the clock rather than defend their rules.

Way forward - The National Sports Governance Act, 2025, in force since 1 January 2026, establishes a National Sports Tribunal headed by a sitting or former Supreme Court judge for speedy dispute resolution, with appeal to the Supreme Court under Section 25 [2][3]; Tribunal Rules and member selection are under way [4]. - Courts may retain recurring but short-lived questions for decision even after mootness, and federations should codify transparent, discretion-enabled selection policies.

Judicial economy and legal clarity are complementary, not competing: a functioning tribunal tier deciding merits in real time lets constitutional courts economise without leaving athletes' rights in limbo, advancing the Act's promise of accountable, athlete-centric sports governance.

(~335 words)

Sources: 1. "WFI moves SC against HC order allowing Vinesh in trials", The Hindu, 29 May 2026 — Delhi HC order, exclusionary-policy finding, trial dates and the plea's disposal 2. The National Sports Governance Act, 2025 (full text, PRS Legislative Research) — National Sports Tribunal, composition, Section 25 appeal to the Supreme Court 3. PIB — Notification of Commencement of Select Provisions of the National Sports Governance Act, 2025 — Act in force from 1 January 2026 4. PIB — Government invites applications for appointment of members to the National Sports Tribunal — Tribunal Rules notified, member selection under way