The Supreme Court's reluctance to strike down the Shariat Application Act, 1937 highlights the tension between fundamental rights and personal law autonomy. Critically examine.

Q. The Supreme Court's reluctance to strike down the Shariat Application Act, 1937 highlights the tension between fundamental rights and personal law autonomy. Critically examine. (15 marks, 250-350 words)

Section 2 of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937 makes Shariat the rule of decision in intestate succession, so a daughter takes half a son's share and a widow with children one-eighth [1]. The Court's refusal to strike it down is prudent, but it leaves the constitutional question open.

Why the restraint is defensible - Legal vacuum: the 1937 Act only applies uncodified Shariat; invalidating it would leave no statutory succession law for Muslims, pushing courts back onto classical texts [1]. - Separation of powers: personal law falls under Entry 5, List III, and Article 44 is a Directive Principle addressed to the legislature, not the judiciary [2]. - Durability of legislated reform: the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019 settled the triple talaq question with democratic sanction [3], whereas the judicial gain in Shah Bano (1985) was diluted by statute in 1986. - Federal experimentation: the Uniform Civil Code of Uttarakhand, 2024 demonstrates that an elected route to uniform succession rules already exists [4].

Why the tension remains unresolved - The inequality is state-enforced: Articles 14, 15 and 21 are engaged the moment a court decrees a smaller share for a daughter [2]. - Comparative inequity: the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 made daughters coparceners in Mitakshara property, leaving Muslim women without an equivalent remedy [5]. - Cost of deference: with no legislative initiative on inheritance, "await Parliament" risks converting restraint into indefinite denial of relief. - Precedent: personal-law practices have been tested against fundamental rights before, so restraint here reflects choice, not want of jurisdiction.

The Court is right that the durable remedy is legislative, but that cannot justify indefinite deferral. A consultative, codified succession law — gender-just, drawing on Uttarakhand's experience and the mandate of Article 44 — would reconcile personal law autonomy with equality and advance SDG-5 on gender parity.

(~315 words)

Sources: 1. The Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937 — Bare Act, India Code — Section 2 scope; inheritance shares of daughters and widows 2. The Constitution of India, India Code — Articles 14, 15, 21, 44; Entry 5, List III, Seventh Schedule 3. The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019, India Code — legislative reform of Muslim personal law 4. The Uniform Civil Code of Uttarakhand, 2024 (Act No. 3 of 2024), PRS Legislative Research — state-level UCC enactment 5. The Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 — Section 6, India Code — daughters as coparceners