The Anti-Defection Law was designed to curb political instability, yet group-recognition disputes continue to undermine its intent. Critically examine.

Q. The Anti-Defection Law was designed to curb political instability, yet group-recognition disputes continue to undermine its intent. Critically examine. (15 marks, 250-350 words)

The Tenth Schedule, inserted by the 52nd Amendment (1985), sought to end the "Aaya Ram Gaya Ram" culture by disqualifying legislators who voluntarily give up party membership or defy the whip [1]. Four decades on, it secures governmental stability but has shifted defection from open floor-crossing to procedural claims of separate group recognition.

Where the law has delivered - Curbs individual defection: a member elected on a party ticket cannot cross over without losing the seat, ending the toppling games of the 1960s–70s [1]. - Constitutionally validated: in Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992) the Supreme Court upheld the Schedule as consistent with the basic structure, affirming party discipline as a legitimate goal [2]. - Predictable majorities allow governments to complete terms and pass a stable legislative agenda.

Where the intent is undermined - The two-thirds merger escape: bulk defection is rewarded while individual dissent is punished; parties are absorbed incrementally until the threshold is reached [1]. - Group recognition is outside the Schedule: it flows from each House's Rules of Procedure and is the Speaker's prerogative, so rival factions bypass disqualification altogether — as with the petitions of 20 Trinamool Congress and 6 Shiv Sena (UBT) MPs pending before the Lok Sabha Speaker [4]. - No time limit on the presiding officer, who is himself a partisan figure; defectors continue to sit and vote while pleas remain undecided [1]. - Judicial review is narrow, confined to mala fides or perversity, so delay itself becomes the remedy [2]. - Chills conscience and oversight: members vote by whip rather than constituency interest, weakening legislative accountability over the executive [3].

The law has therefore bought stability at the cost of intra-party democracy and deliberative quality. Restricting the whip to confidence motions and money bills, fixing a time-bound decision, and shifting adjudication to an independent authority outside the House would realign it with its purpose [3]. Reformed thus, the Tenth Schedule can protect mandates without silencing the representative it was meant to discipline.

(~315 words)

Sources: 1. The Anti-Defection Law Explained — PRS Legislative Research — grounds of disqualification; two-thirds merger exception; no deadline on the presiding officer's decision 2. Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu and Others (1992) — Supreme Court of India — Tenth Schedule upheld; Para 7 struck down; judicial review limited to mala fides/perversity 3. The Anti-Defection Law That Does Not Aid Stability — PRS Legislative Research — erosion of legislator's conscience and legislative oversight; reform direction 4. "Monsoon Session likely to begin on July 20" — The Hindu, 1 July 2026 (link not verifiable) — 20 TMC and 6 Shiv Sena (UBT) MPs seeking separate group recognition; decision pending with Speaker