The repeated failure of Constitution Amendment Bills for social representation raises questions about both parliamentary arithmetic and federal consensus. Discuss with recent examples.

Q. The repeated failure of Constitution Amendment Bills for social representation raises questions about both parliamentary arithmetic and federal consensus. Discuss with recent examples. (15 marks, 250-350 words)

Article 368 gives Parliament wide amending power, but its special majority — and State ratification where federal provisions are touched — makes social-representation amendments hostage to numbers and consensus alike. The recent defeat of the women's reservation Amendment Bill exposes both fault lines.

Parliamentary arithmetic: the first barrier - A Constitution Amendment needs a majority of total membership plus two-thirds of members present and voting in each House — a far higher bar than the simple majority for ordinary bills. - Recent example: the Constitution Amendment Bill providing women's reservation effective 2029 along with an increase in Lok Sabha strength was defeated in the Lok Sabha in the session preceding Monsoon Session 2026 [1]. - Coalition fragility compounds it: 20 TMC and 6 Shiv Sena (UBT) MPs have sought recognition as separate groups before the Speaker [1], making whip enforcement and floor management uncertain. - Shrinking legislative time narrows the window for building numbers — Budget Session 2026 passed 9 Bills over 31 sittings [2], and Monsoon Session 2026 is likely to run about three weeks against the 20-sitting norm [1], compared with 21 sittings and 15 Bills in Monsoon Session 2025 [3].

Federal consensus: the second barrier - The proviso to Article 368(2) requires ratification by legislatures of not less than half the States for amendments altering representation of States in Parliament — so a seat-increase amendment cannot be a Centre-only decision. - Seat expansion is linked to delimitation on population, which States that successfully curbed population growth see as eroding their relative weight — consent becomes a bargaining question, not a formality. - Women's reservation also binds State Assemblies, making States implementers rather than bystanders. The 101st Amendment (GST) succeeded precisely because negotiation preceded the vote.

Representation reform therefore fails less from lack of intent than from sequencing — voting before consensus. Structured pre-legislative consultation, use of the Inter-State Council, and a predictable, fuller sessional calendar — Article 85 only bars gaps beyond six months [4] — would let numbers follow agreement, advancing the political equality the Preamble promises.

(~330 words)

Sources: 1. Monsoon Session likely to begin on July 20 — The Hindu, 1 July 2026 — defeat of the women's reservation Constitution Amendment Bill; TMC and Shiv Sena (UBT) group-recognition petitions; ~3-week session against the 20-sitting norm 2. Both Houses of Parliament Pass 9 Bills during the Budget Session — PIB — 9 Bills passed over 31 sittings in Budget Session 2026 3. Monsoon Session of Parliament adjourns sine die — PIB — 21 sittings and 15 Bills passed in Monsoon Session 2025 4. Explained: A look at how and when Parliament is convened — PRS Legislative Research — Article 85 and the six-month maximum gap between sessions