Centre-State relations in India are increasingly strained by the conduct of Governors in opposition-ruled states. Do you agree? Suggest institutional reforms to address this.

Q. Centre-State relations in India are increasingly strained by the conduct of Governors in opposition-ruled States. Do you agree? Suggest institutional reforms to address this. (15 marks, 250-350 words)

Article 155 makes the Governor a Union appointee, while Article 163 renders them a largely titular head bound by ministerial advice [1]. This dual character has turned Raj Bhavan into a recurring site of federal friction; the claim is therefore largely, though not wholly, valid.

Yes: the strain is real - Government formation: In Tamil Nadu (May 2026), the Governor's press release demanded physical letters of MLA support from the single largest party before inviting it to form the government, prompting two writ petitions in the Supreme Court [4]. S.R. Bommai (1994) holds that majority is testable only on the floor of the House, not through private satisfaction. - Assent to Bills: Article 200 prescribes no timeline; legislative reviews record State Bills pending with Governors for years, delaying implementation [1][3]. - Pattern, not aberration: Kerala, Punjab, Telangana and Maharashtra have seen similar standoffs, making this a structural rather than episodic problem.

But the picture must be qualified - Article 163(2) grants genuine discretion, most defensibly in hung assemblies [1]. - Post-poll manoeuvring and disputed support letters by parties themselves invite gubernatorial caution; in Tamil Nadu the deadlock ended constitutionally with the swearing-in of the Chief Minister on May 10, 2026 [4].

Institutional reforms - Appointment: select an eminent, non-partisan person in consultation with the Chief Minister, as urged by the Sarkaria and Punchhi Commissions [2]. - Tenure security: dilute the "doctrine of pleasure" through a fixed tenure and a structured removal procedure [2]. - Codify timelines for assent under Article 200 and for inviting a claimant, with a time-bound floor test [1][3]. - Institutionalise dialogue: an active Inter-State Council and a binding code of conduct for Governors [2].

The Governor should be a constitutional bridge, not a political flashpoint. Codifying discretion along Punchhi lines would restore trust, strengthening the cooperative federalism that the Constitution envisages.

(~320 words)

Sources: 1. The Constitution of India — Legislative Department, Ministry of Law and Justice — Articles 155, 163, 163(2), 164 and 200 on appointment, discretion and assent 2. Report of the Commission on Centre-State Relations (Punchhi Commission, 2010), Inter-State Council Secretariat — recommendations on Governor's appointment, tenure, discretion (reviewing Sarkaria) and Inter-State Council 3. PRS Legislative Research, Annual Review of State Laws 2023 — pendency of State Bills awaiting gubernatorial assent 4. “Second plea filed in SC against T.N. Governor”, The Hindu, May 10, 2026 — Governor's May 7 press release, the writ petitions, and the subsequent swearing-in