In the light of the S.R. Bommai judgment (1994) and subsequent SC rulings, examine the limits of a Governor's discretionary power when no single party commands a clear majority in a state legislature.

Article 163(1) binds the Governor to ministerial advice except where the Constitution requires him to act in his discretion [3]. A hung Assembly is precisely where that residual discretion bites — and where Bommai recast it from unreviewable subjective satisfaction into a justiciable, floor-test-bound power.

Source and scope of the discretion

• Article 164(1) empowers the Governor to appoint the Chief Minister; Article 163(2) shields certain discretionary acts from question [3].
• The rule of inviting the single largest party or the alliance with demonstrated support is a constitutional convention, not a textual mandate — which is why its breach recurs.

Limits laid down by Bommai and after

• S.R. Bommai (1994), a nine-judge bench, held the floor of the House to be the sole legitimate arena for testing majority, barring a "roving enquiry" or private consultation by the Governor [1].
• It established that the Governor's satisfaction is subject to judicial review on the relevance of material — ending the immunity claim [1].
• Nabam Rebia (2016) confirmed that Article 163(2) is not a blanket bar: the Governor's powers to summon, dissolve or advance a session are reviewable [2].
• Implicit corollary: delay is itself unconstitutional, since an unreasonable gap before invitation enables defection and horse-trading.

The unregulated residue — Tamil Nadu, 2026

• After the April 2026 election, TVK won 108 of 234 seats; the Governor's press release demanded physical letters of MLA support before inviting its leader — a step with no constitutional basis [5].
• Two writ petitions reached the Supreme Court within 48 hours, before the swearing-in ended the standoff — showing that order and timing of invitation remain uncodified [5].

Thus judicial doctrine has narrowed the Governor's discretion to a procedural trigger, not a substantive veto, yet leaves timelines unspecified. Codifying the Sarkaria–Punchhi recommendations — a fixed order of preference and a time-bound, immediately-tested invitation [4] — would align the office with its intended role as a constitutional, not political, functionary.