·The Hindu·15 marks·250–350 wordsPolityEconomyS&T

The Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010 has been cited as a major impediment to both domestic private investment and foreign participation in India's nuclear sector. Evaluate its implications and suggest reforms.

In this answer
  1. Merits: a victim-centric regime
  2. Implications: why it impeded investment
  3. Reforms: enacted and pending

The Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010 (CLNDA) channelled no-fault liability to the operator, but its Section 17(b) right of recourse against suppliers for "patent or latent defects" made India an outlier among global liability regimes [1]. It was victim-protective in design yet investment-chilling in effect — a balance its 2025 replacement has now recalibrated.

Merits: a victim-centric regime

  • No-fault liability ensures compensation regardless of proof of negligence, with a defined operator cap and Central Government backing [1].
  • Post-Bhopal, supplier recourse created a deterrent against sub-standard equipment, embedding accountability in the nuclear supply chain [1].
  • The India Nuclear Insurance Pool (GIC Re-led) was created to price and absorb this recourse risk commercially [1].

Implications: why it impeded investment

  • Supplier exposure was open-ended and largely uninsurable, so foreign vendors sought prolonged clarifications, delaying flagship projects.
  • Domestic suppliers and MSMEs could not price latent-defect risk, shrinking indigenous component manufacturing.
  • It constrained the Nuclear Energy Mission (₹20,000 crore; five SMRs by 2033; 100 GW by 2047) by deterring the private capital such scale requires [2].
  • Private players were confined to financing and project-development roles — as in the Fairwood Nuclear–SK Securities SMR/MMR pact of June 2026 — rather than ownership [4].

Reforms: enacted and pending

  • The SHANTI Act, 2025 repeals the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 and CLNDA, removes defective-equipment as a ground for recourse, replaces the flat cap with tiered liability (₹100–3,000 crore by capacity), licenses private companies and joint ventures, and gives AERB statutory status [3].
  • Pending: companies incorporated abroad remain ineligible — ratifying the CSC framework fully would unlock FDI and technology partnerships.
  • Deepen insurance pool capacity, standardise supplier contracts, and staff the regulator adequately.

CLNDA thus secured victims but slowed capacity addition; the 2025 reset restores that balance. Sustained investor confidence now depends on transparent rules and regulatory independence, aligning nuclear expansion with India's Net-Zero 2070 pledge and SDG-7 on affordable clean energy.

Sources

  1. 1FAQs on the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010 — Department of Atomic Energyno-fault liability, Section 17(b) supplier recourse, India Nuclear Insurance Pool
  2. 2Nuclear Power in Union Budget 2025-26 — PIB, Department of Atomic Energy₹20,000 crore Nuclear Energy Mission, five SMRs by 2033, 100 GW by 2047
  3. 3The Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement of Nuclear Energy for Transforming India (SHANTI) Bill, 2025 — PRS Legislative Researchrepeal of the 1962 and 2010 Acts, tiered liability, narrowed recourse, private licensing, statutory AERB
  4. 4"Fairwood, SK Securities sign small reactor project pact" — *The Hindu*, 4 June 2026 (link not verifiable) — private financing tie-up for SMR/MMR development in India
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