Discuss the constitutional significance of the *Anoop Baranwal* judgment and examine whether the CEC and Other ECs Act, 2023 undermines the independence of the Election Commission of India.

Q. Discuss the constitutional significance of the Anoop Baranwal judgment and examine whether the CEC and Other ECs Act, 2023 undermines the independence of the Election Commission of India. (15 marks, 250-350 words)

Article 324(2) vests appointment of the CEC and Election Commissioners in the President, "subject to any law made by Parliament" — a law that remained unenacted for over seven decades, leaving appointments to executive discretion. Anoop Baranwal (2023) sought to fill this vacuum, and Parliament's legislative response has reopened the debate on the ECI's insulation.

Constitutional significance of Anoop Baranwal (2023) - A five-judge Constitution Bench (2 March 2023) held that, until Parliament legislates, appointments shall be made on the advice of a committee of the PM, Leader of Opposition in Lok Sabha and the CJI [1]. - It read free and fair elections as intrinsic to democracy, holding that sole executive control over the appointing power is constitutionally suspect [1]. - It was self-limiting — expressly interim and subject to a future law — thus respecting Parliament's competence rather than usurping it [1]. - It also urged structural safeguards such as a permanent secretariat and protected service conditions for ECs [1].

Concerns that the 2023 Act dilutes independence - The Act repealed the 1991 Act and replaced the CJI with a Union Cabinet Minister nominated by the PM, creating a standing 2:1 executive majority on the Selection Committee [2][3]. - The Search Committee headed by the Cabinet Secretary shortlists candidates, so the executive controls both the pool and the choice [3]. - Eligibility is confined to officers of Secretary rank, narrowing the field [3]. - The Supreme Court has observed that justice must not only be done but be "seen to be done" — neutrality of perception matters for a poll body [4].

The contrary view - Article 324(2) reserves the field to Parliament; the Court's committee was avowedly a stop-gap [1][2]. - Including the CJI in an executive appointment may compromise later judicial review; the Centre argues the PM's judgment cannot be presumed untrustworthy [4]. - The Act ends a long legislative void, fixing tenure and salary parity with a Supreme Court judge; the Court has not stayed it [2][4].

The Act is thus constitutionally defensible in form but weak in optics. Adding one genuinely neutral member — a retired CJI or eminent person — with a permanent secretariat and transparent shortlisting would honour Baranwal's spirit while preserving parliamentary supremacy, strengthening both the independence and the perceived neutrality on which electoral democracy rests.

(~330 words)

Sources: 1. Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India, Supreme Court judgment dated 02-03-2023 — Constitution Bench ruling, PM–LoP–CJI interim committee, interim nature, structural safeguards 2. The Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023 (Act 49 of 2023), India Code — statutory Selection Committee, repeal of the 1991 Act, tenure and conditions of service 3. PRS Legislative Research — CEC and Other Election Commissioners Bill, 2023 — Cabinet Secretary-led Search Committee, Secretary-rank eligibility, salary parity with a Supreme Court judge 4. The Hindu, "Centre defends CEC panel without CJI", 31 July 2026 — Centre's argument in the pending challenge, the Bench's "seen to be done" observation, no stay on the Act