The doctrine of 'separation of powers' does not mean an absolute demarcation of functions between organs of the state. Critically examine in light of the ongoing dispute over CEC/EC appointment process.

Q. The doctrine of 'separation of powers' does not mean an absolute demarcation of functions between organs of the state. Critically examine in light of the ongoing dispute over CEC/EC appointment process. (15 marks, 250-350 words)

In India separation of powers works as functional differentiation with checks and balances, not watertight compartments. The dispute over who selects the Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) and Election Commissioners (ECs) illustrates both the necessity and the limits of this overlap.

How the doctrine permits overlap - Article 324(2) itself contemplates overlap: appointment is by the President (executive) "subject to any law made by Parliament" (legislature). - Filling that legislative vacuum, the Constitution Bench in Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India (2 March 2023) directed appointment on the advice of the PM, Leader of Opposition and the CJI — the judiciary supplying an interim norm [1]. - Parliament responded with the CEC and Other ECs (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023, repealing the 1991 Act — a legitimate exercise of its enumerated power [2].

Where the overlap becomes contested - The 2023 Act replaced the CJI with a PM-nominated Union Cabinet Minister, giving the government two of three votes on the panel and, petitioners argue, guaranteeing executive dominance over a constitutional body [2][3]. - Hearing the challenge, the Court observed that the concern is not distrust of the Prime Minister but that justice must be seen to be done — institutional neutrality matters as much as independence [3]. - The Centre counters that judicial vetting of executive appointments is itself a breach: by that logic an outsider must clear Cabinet Ministers too; an elected executive answerable to Parliament is the constitutionally accountable appointer [3].

Assessment Both positions concede overlap; they differ on its direction. A CJI on a selection panel risks the judge later reviewing his own choice, yet a panel with an in-built executive majority weakens the ECI's perceived impartiality.

The resolution therefore lies not in rigid demarcation but in calibrated checks — a transparent, plural and reasoned selection process. Whether through a neutral member, published criteria, or bipartisan consultation, a design that visibly insulates the Election Commission would honour both parliamentary competence and the constitutional promise of free and fair elections.

(~330 words)

Sources: 1. Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India, 2023 INSC 190 (Supreme Court of India) — Constitution Bench direction on a PM–LoP–CJI selection committee 2. The Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Bill, 2023 — PRS Legislative Research — panel composition substituting a Union Minister for the CJI; repeal of the 1991 Act; 2-of-3 government majority 3. "Centre defends CEC panel without CJI", The Hindu, 31 July 2026 — Centre's argument in the Supreme Court and the Bench's "justice seen to be done" observation