Discuss the constitutional and statutory basis for the CBI's jurisdiction to investigate offences committed by Union government employees within a State's territory. Illustrate with a recent case.

The CBI has no dedicated constitutional charter of its own. "Public order" and "police" are State subjects (Entries 1 and 2, List II), so its power to probe a Union employee inside a State rests on a layered constitutional–statutory arrangement, now tested afresh in the Enforcement Directorate officer's bribery case before the Supreme Court.

Constitutional basis

• Entry 8, List I ("Central Bureau of Intelligence and Investigation") and Entry 80, List I, which permits extension of one jurisdiction's police powers into another with that State's consent — the constitutional hinge of the CBI's reach [1].
• Article 73 makes Union executive power co-extensive with Parliament's legislative competence, enabling Central superintendence over such investigations.
• Articles 32, 136 and 142: constitutional courts may direct a CBI probe without State consent, since judicial direction is not executive encroachment on List II [4].

Statutory basis

• The Delhi Special Police Establishment (DSPE) Act, 1946 constitutes the force (S.2), notifies investigable offences (S.3), extends powers to States (S.5), and — crucially — makes that extension operative only with State consent under Section 6 [1].
• Consent is general (blanket, typically for corruption cases against Central employees) or case-specific; several States have withdrawn general consent, shrinking the CBI's routine entry [2].
• Section 6A, requiring prior Central approval to probe senior officers, was struck down as violating Article 14 [4]. Substantive offences flow from the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

Recent illustration Tamil Nadu's DVAC arrested ED Enforcement Officer Ankit Tiwari for allegedly taking a ₹20 lakh bribe in Dindigul. The ED sought transfer to the CBI; the Supreme Court stayed DVAC proceedings and, in August 2026, mulled the larger question of who probes Union employees [5].

Cooperative federalism requires neither Central capture nor State retaliation. Institutionalising a neutral, time-bound referral mechanism, as the Punchhi Commission urged for inter-jurisdictional crimes [3], would protect both State autonomy and impartial anti-corruption enforcement.