Should offences by Central government employees always be probed by Central agencies rather than State police? Critically examine in the context of cooperative federalism.

Police is a State subject (Entry 2, List II), while the CBI's jurisdiction inside a State rests on "general consent" under Section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 [1]. The Supreme Court's move to consider shifting Tamil Nadu DVAC's bribery case against an Enforcement Directorate officer to the CBI revives this contest [2]. A blanket rule of Central primacy is neither constitutionally sound nor practically desirable.

Case for probe by Central agencies

• Disciplinary logic: service conditions, transfers and departmental action against Union employees vest with the Centre, so a Central probe aligns investigation with sanction and prosecution authority.
• Insulation from retaliation: the ED argues the DVAC case answers its money-laundering probes against State politicians — a risk where Centre–State relations are adversarial [2].
• Cross-border offences: bribery linked to PMLA, customs or tax functions often spans States; the CBI's countrywide reach suits such cases.
• Judicial route exists: constitutional courts may direct a CBI probe even without State consent [3].

Case against an automatic rule

• Federal erosion: the offence occurs on State soil, with local complainants and witnesses; routine transfer hollows out Entry 2 and signals distrust of State police.
• Consent withdrawn widely: ten States, including Tamil Nadu, have withdrawn general consent, showing the depth of the trust deficit [3].
• Conflict of interest cuts both ways: moving a case against a Central officer to another Central agency is no more neutral; the Second ARC urged genuinely independent anti-corruption machinery [4].
• Justice delayed: DVAC proceedings have remained stayed since January 2024, leaving the trial in limbo [2].

Hence the answer is calibrated, not absolute: State police should ordinarily retain jurisdiction, with transfer as a judicially-tested exception where bias or inter-State spread is demonstrated. Statutory guidelines for consent, time-bound court-monitored transfers and a joint Centre–State mechanism, as the Punchhi Commission's cooperative-federalism framework envisages [5], can protect both State autonomy and honest investigation.