Distinguish between the judiciary's in-house procedure and the statutory removal process under the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968.

Judicial accountability in India runs on two distinct tracks: an internal, judiciary-devised mechanism for examining complaints against judges, and a formal constitutional-cum-statutory process culminating in removal by the President. They differ in origin, participants and consequence — crucially, only the second can actually unseat a judge.

The in-house procedure (1999)

• Non-statutory in character — evolved by the Supreme Court itself and adopted in 1999, without any backing Act of Parliament [2].
• Covers allegations relating to a judge's discharge of judicial functions or to conduct or behaviour outside court, including complaints falling short of "proved misbehaviour" [2].
• Inquiry is conducted within the judiciary, on a complaint routed through the Chief Justice, and the process is confidential.
• Its outcome is remedial and advisory — counselling, a request to resign, or at most a recommendation that removal proceedings be initiated. It cannot by itself remove a judge [2].

Statutory removal under the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968

• Rooted in the Constitution: Article 124(4) for Supreme Court judges and Article 218 for High Court judges; the sole ground is "proved misbehaviour or incapacity" [1].
• The 1968 Act, enacted under Article 124(5), lays down the procedure for investigation and proof of such charges [3].
• Initiated by legislators — a notice signed by at least 100 Lok Sabha members to the Speaker, or 50 Rajya Sabha members to the Chairman, which the presiding officer may admit or refuse [1].
• If admitted, a three-member committee — a Supreme Court judge, a High Court Chief Justice and a distinguished jurist — investigates [1].
• On a finding of misbehaviour, each House must adopt the motion by a special majority (majority of total membership and two-thirds present and voting), after which the President orders removal [1].

Thus the two are complementary, not competing: the in-house route offers swift internal correction, the statutory route the ultimate constitutional sanction. That no judge of the higher judiciary has yet been removed through it [2] argues for a codified, time-bound and transparent accountability framework — one that strengthens public confidence while preserving judicial independence.