The mechanism for removal of judges in India protects judicial independence but has proved ineffective in ensuring accountability. Critically examine.

Q. The mechanism for removal of judges in India protects judicial independence but has proved ineffective in ensuring accountability. Critically examine. (15 marks, 250-350 words)

Article 124(4) allows removal of a Supreme Court judge only for "proved misbehaviour or incapacity", extended to High Court judges by Article 218 and elaborated by the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 [1]. The design deliberately privileges independence — but that same design has made accountability largely unattainable.

How the mechanism safeguards judicial independence - Narrow ground: a judge cannot be removed for unpopular judgments, only for proved misbehaviour or incapacity [1]. - Judicial fact-finding precedes the political vote: a three-member committee — a Supreme Court judge, a High Court Chief Justice and a distinguished jurist — frames and proves charges [1]. - No executive discretion: adoption needs a majority of the total membership of each House and two-thirds of those present and voting; the President's order merely follows [1]. - High entry threshold: notices need 100 Lok Sabha or 50 Rajya Sabha signatories, filtering frivolous or vindictive motions [1].

Why it has proved ineffective in ensuring accountability - No judge has ever been removed through the full process. Justice Soumitra Sen, held "guilty of misbehaviour" by the inquiry committee on a motion by 58 Rajya Sabha members, resigned before it concluded [2]. - Numbers override findings: once proof is established, the outcome still turns on party strength, whips and abstentions rather than the committee's conclusions. - All-or-nothing remedy: there is no graded sanction — censure, fine or suspension — so lesser misconduct attracts no formal penalty. - Stopgap substitutes: the judiciary's non-statutory in-house procedure can only recommend withdrawal of judicial work, as in the 2025 inquiry against a sitting High Court judge, not remove him [3]. - Reform stalled: the Judicial Standards and Accountability Bill, 2010 — asset disclosure, citizen complaints, a National Judicial Oversight Committee — cleared the Lok Sabha in 2012 but never became law [4].

The mechanism is therefore a strong shield but a blunt sword. A statutory framework offering graded sanctions, time-bound admission of motions and a codified in-house procedure would make accountability routine rather than exceptional — strengthening, not diluting, the independence Article 124 was written to protect.

(~310 words)

Sources: 1. Explainer: Removal of Judges from Office — PRS Legislative Research — Articles 124(4)/218, Judges (Inquiry) Act 1968, notice thresholds, inquiry committee composition, special majority, President's order 2. Allegations against Justice Soumitra Sen: Inquiry Committee Report — PRS Legislative Research — motion by 58 Rajya Sabha members; committee's finding of "misbehaviour" 3. Press Release dated May 5, 2025 — Supreme Court of India — in-house inquiry committee report and withdrawal of judicial work from the judge concerned 4. The Judicial Standards and Accountability Bill, 2010 — PRS Legislative Research — asset disclosure, citizen complaints, National Judicial Oversight Committee; passed Lok Sabha in March 2012