The mechanism for removal of judges in India protects judicial independence but has proved ineffective in ensuring accountability. Critically examine.

Article 124(4) allows removal of a Supreme Court judge only for "proved misbehaviour or incapacity", extended to High Court judges by Article 218 and elaborated by the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 [1]. The design deliberately privileges independence — but that same design has made accountability largely unattainable.

How the mechanism safeguards judicial independence

• Narrow ground: a judge cannot be removed for unpopular judgments, only for proved misbehaviour or incapacity [1].
• Judicial fact-finding precedes the political vote: a three-member committee — a Supreme Court judge, a High Court Chief Justice and a distinguished jurist — frames and proves charges [1].
• No executive discretion: adoption needs a majority of the total membership of each House and two-thirds of those present and voting; the President's order merely follows [1].
• High entry threshold: notices need 100 Lok Sabha or 50 Rajya Sabha signatories, filtering frivolous or vindictive motions [1].

Why it has proved ineffective in ensuring accountability

• No judge has ever been removed through the full process. Justice Soumitra Sen, held "guilty of misbehaviour" by the inquiry committee on a motion by 58 Rajya Sabha members, resigned before it concluded [2].
• Numbers override findings: once proof is established, the outcome still turns on party strength, whips and abstentions rather than the committee's conclusions.
• All-or-nothing remedy: there is no graded sanction — censure, fine or suspension — so lesser misconduct attracts no formal penalty.
• Stopgap substitutes: the judiciary's non-statutory in-house procedure can only recommend withdrawal of judicial work, as in the 2025 inquiry against a sitting High Court judge, not remove him [3].
• Reform stalled: the Judicial Standards and Accountability Bill, 2010 — asset disclosure, citizen complaints, a National Judicial Oversight Committee — cleared the Lok Sabha in 2012 but never became law [4].

The mechanism is therefore a strong shield but a blunt sword. A statutory framework offering graded sanctions, time-bound admission of motions and a codified in-house procedure would make accountability routine rather than exceptional — strengthening, not diluting, the independence Article 124 was written to protect.