Evaluate the CERT-In directions of 2022. Do they adequately cover non-malicious disruptions of digital services?
New · District CollectorCan you hold the district for 72 hours?Floods, a heatwave, an outbreak, a grievance queue. Take the decisions, see the consequences.Play →On April 28, 2022, the Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In) issued directions under the Information Technology Act, 2000 [1]. They require covered entities to report cyber incidents within six hours [1]. The directions strengthen India's security response. However, they are built around security incidents and leave non-malicious service outages largely unaddressed.
Merits of the 2022 directions
- Speed: The six-hour reporting window lets CERT-In respond quickly to threats at the national level [1].
- Wide reach: They cover service providers, intermediaries, data centres and body corporates. This includes foreign firms serving Indian users [1].
- Statutory footing: They derive authority from the IT Act, so they are binding and not just advisory [1].
- Situational awareness: During the July 2024 CrowdStrike faulty-update outage, CERT-In issued a "Critical" advisory with remediation steps [3].
Limitations
- Reporting goes one way: Reports go to CERT-In, not to affected customers. Microsoft's apology and its explanation of the cause were voluntary, and fuller details are still awaited [2].
- Fragmented regime: Three sets of rules apply to outages, and each has a gap [2].
- Blunt design: Extending the same six-hour clock to every glitch would flood CERT-In with reports and pull engineers away from fixing the fault.
Adequacy for non-malicious disruptions
- The trigger is an attack, not a breakdown: Microsoft blamed the Microsoft 365 outage of November 12–13, 2026 on a fault in an upgrade of its network capacity [2]. Because nothing malicious happened, the event may fall outside the six-hour rule.
- Real-world harm: IndiGo and Akasa Air warned passengers that email support was disrupted, and Air India rerouted its email [2]. Passengers are not party to any cloud service-level agreement, so they have no remedy.
- The line between outage and security risk blurs: CERT-In flagged a phishing campaign exploiting the CrowdStrike outage [4]. An innocent outage quickly became a security threat, yet CERT-In's response was ad hoc.
On balance, the directions are sound for cyber incidents but inadequate for non-malicious outages. As a way forward, MeitY could create a separate, lighter outage-reporting category. It would apply to large outages hitting critical sectors and require a public root-cause analysis. Public CERT-In advisories could become standard practice, and the duty could be written into the proposed Digital India Act. This would make providers accountable and services resilient in line with the goals of Digital India.
Sources
- 1CERT-In, FAQs on Cyber Security Directions of 28.04.2022 (May 2022)issued under the IT Act, 2000; six-hour reporting; entities covered
- 2How does India address service outages? (N.V. Geetha), *The Hindu*, Nov 17, 2026 (explainer)Microsoft 365 outage of Nov 12–13, 2026; network-upgrade fault; voluntary disclosure; disruption at IndiGo, Akasa Air and Air India; three rule-sets with gaps
- 3CERT-In Advisory CIAD-2024-0035 (July 2024)"Critical" advisory on the CrowdStrike faulty-update outage
- 4CERT-In Current Activity CICA-2024-3308 (July 2024)phishing campaign exploiting the CrowdStrike outage