India's cyber-incident reporting framework is security-centric and leaves service outages largely unregulated. Critically examine in light of recent global cloud outages.
New · District CollectorCan you hold the district for 72 hours?Floods, a heatwave, an outbreak, a grievance queue. Take the decisions, see the consequences.Play →India's main reporting tool is the CERT-In directions of 28 April 2022, issued under the IT Act, 2000. They require cyber incidents to be reported within six hours [2]. On 12–13 November 2026, a fault in a network-capacity upgrade caused a global Microsoft 365 outage. It disrupted IndiGo, Akasa Air and Air India [1]. The outage shows the statement is largely true, though not wholly.
Why the framework is security-centric
- An attack triggers reporting, a breakdown does not: the six-hour duty covers a listed set of cyber-incident types [2]. A fault during an internal upgrade may fall outside it [1].
- Reports go to the state, not to users: the law gives passengers and airlines no right to an explanation. Microsoft apologised and named the cause voluntarily, and full details are still awaited [1].
- No outage law: three overlapping sets of rules apply, and each has a gap [1]. None requires a provider to guarantee availability or disclose the root cause.
- Concentration risk: one fault in a foreign provider cut passenger-support channels in a critical sector [1].
Why "unregulated" overstates it
- Wide reach: the directions cover cloud providers and even entities outside India [3].
- Advisory role: CERT-In rated the July 2024 CrowdStrike update crash Critical and shared fixes [4]. It later warned of phishing that exploited that outage [5]. So it treated a failure with an innocent cause as a security risk.
- Contracts and markets: service-level agreements (SLAs) with enterprises and the risk to reputation already push providers to restore service fast. A six-hour rule for every glitch would flood CERT-In.
- Limits of contracts: passengers are not parties to SLAs between airlines and cloud providers, so contracts do not protect them.
Way forward
- MeitY/CERT-In: add a threshold-based outage category for large or critical-sector outages. It should require an early notice and a later root-cause analysis.
- CERT-In: make public outage advisories a standard procedure, building on its 2024 practice [5].
- Civil Aviation: require a backup passenger-contact channel that does not depend on the same provider. Air India's rerouting of email shows this is feasible [1].
- Legal footing: write the duty into the proposed Digital India Act.
India's framework guards well against attacks but leaves availability failures to vendor goodwill. A calibrated duty to account for outages would complete the framework without over-regulation. It would make Digital India's service delivery resilient and trustworthy.
Sources
- 1How does India address service outages? — The Hindu explainer, 17 Nov 2026Microsoft 365 outage dates and cause; airline disruption; voluntary disclosure; three rule-sets with gaps; Air India rerouting email
- 2CERT-In Directions under Section 70B(6) of the IT Act, 28.04.2022six-hour reporting of listed cyber-incident types
- 3CERT-In FAQs on Cyber Security Directions of 28.04.2022applies to cloud providers and to entities outside India
- 4CERT-In Advisory CIAD-2024-0035 (CrowdStrike Falcon Sensor issue, July 2024)rated Critical; fixes shared
- 5CERT-In Current Activity CICA-2024-3308phishing campaign exploiting the CrowdStrike outage
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