Maritime cooperation has become the centrepiece of India-ASEAN relations. Discuss its scope and limitations in the context of ASEAN centrality.
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ASEAN centrality means that ASEAN-led platforms set the region's agenda and pace. India's Act East policy now puts this idea into practice mainly at sea. India declared 2026 the ASEAN-India Year of Maritime Cooperation [1], building on the 2022 Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP) [5]. The sea gives the partnership its widest scope, but ASEAN's own limits also restrict it most clearly there.
Scope of maritime cooperation
- Security and operations: India proposed the 2nd ASEAN-India Maritime Exercise and a second ASEAN-India Defence Ministers' Meeting [2]. These help the navies work together and trust each other.
- India as convening power: The International Fleet Review 2026 at Visakhapatnam brought together 74 countries and 85 ships [3]. At MILAN 2026, the Raksha Mantri met naval chiefs and delegations from nine ASEAN states [4].
- Non-traditional security: Cooperation covers HADR (disaster relief), maritime security and the blue economy [1]. These are low-friction areas that every ASEAN member can accept.
- Normative convergence: The 2023 Joint Statement on Maritime Cooperation builds on the CSP [6]. Leaders agreed on a maritime work plan anchored in UNCLOS 1982 [7]. This supports a rules-based Indo-Pacific without forcing anyone to choose a bloc.
Limitations
- Consensus pace: ASEAN decides only by consensus, so the work plan moves at the speed of its most cautious member [7]. India cannot push it any faster.
- Divergent threat perceptions: Members see the South China Sea dispute differently. Respecting centrality therefore keeps India from taking a sharper common stand.
- Events over institutions: Most of the maritime year's outputs are exercises, reviews and conferences [2][3]. These are useful but not yet standing, binding mechanisms.
- Lagging economic leg: The AITIGA trade agreement review is still unfinished after ten Joint Committee rounds [8]. This weakens the CSP's economic base.
- Minilateral perception: The more India works through small groupings outside ASEAN, the harder it becomes to claim that ASEAN comes first.
Maritime cooperation is Act East's strongest pillar because it plays to India's naval capacity and respects ASEAN's strategic autonomy. India could use the 2027 anniversaries to turn the maritime year into permanent mechanisms and to finish the AITIGA review. Momentum would then become a lasting partnership for a free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific under UNCLOS.
Sources
- 1PIB: English translation of PM's opening remarks at the 22nd ASEAN-India Summit (Oct 2025)2026 declared Year of Maritime Cooperation; HADR, maritime security, blue economy
- 2PIB: Prime Minister's participation in the 22nd ASEAN-India Summit in Kuala Lumpurproposed 2nd ASEAN-India Maritime Exercise and Defence Ministers' Meeting
- 3PIB: President of India reviews the International Fleet Review 2026 off Visakhapatnam74 countries, 85 ships
- 4PIB: MILAN 2026 – Raksha Mantri interacts with Navy Chiefs from nine ASEAN member statesASEAN naval participation
- 5MEA: Overview of India-ASEAN Relations (2022)CSP upgrade, 12 November 2022
- 6MEA: ASEAN-India Joint Statement on Maritime Cooperation (2023)maritime cooperation framed within the CSP
- 7ASEAN Secretariat: Chairman's Statement of the 22nd ASEAN-India Summitjoint work plan in accordance with UNCLOS 1982
- 8PIB: India hosts 10th Meeting of AITIGA Joint Committee (Aug 2025)AITIGA review still ongoing