Can Parliament legislate to override the 'ethos' of a Supreme Court constitutional bench judgment without violating constitutional morality? Analyse in the context of the 2023 Election Commission Appointments Act.

Q. Can Parliament legislate to override the 'ethos' of a Supreme Court constitutional bench judgment without violating constitutional morality? Analyse in the context of the 2023 Election Commission Appointments Act. (15 marks, 250-350 words)

Article 324(2) permits the President to appoint the CEC and Election Commissioners "subject to the provisions of any law made in that behalf by Parliament." In Anoop Baranwal (2023), a five-judge Bench filled this legislative vacuum with an interim PM–LoP–CJI committee [1]. Whether the succeeding statute honours or hollows out that ruling is the question.

Where Parliament's power is unimpeachable - Legislative competence: the Court's directive was expressly interim, operative only "till Parliament makes a law" [1]. Enacting the 2023 Act therefore fulfils, not defies, the judgment's own terms. - Separation of powers: courts may not permanently occupy the legislative field; the CJI's inclusion was a judicial stopgap, not a constitutional command. - Legislative overruling of a judgment's basis is settled practice; only reversal of a judgment as such is impermissible.

Where the ethos is displaced - The Act substitutes a Union Cabinet Minister nominated by the PM for the CJI, giving the executive a built-in 2:1 majority — the very executive monopoly the Bench found constitutionally unsafe [2][3]. - The Search Committee headed by the Cabinet Secretary shortlists five names, so both filtering and selection stages remain executive-controlled [2]. - Since a ruling party has an inherent interest in perpetuating itself in power, control over ECI appointments creates a structural conflict of interest.

The constitutional morality test - Morality here means fidelity to constitutional purpose, not merely to text. Free and fair elections are a basic-structure value; a formally valid law that predictably erodes ECI independence invites review of substance, not competence. - This mirrors the NJAC logic: form of appointment is judged by the independence it secures.

Parliament may lawfully depart from a judgment's interim design, but not from the constitutional value animating it. A neutral third member — the CJI or a bipartisan nominee — would reconcile legislative supremacy with institutional independence, restoring both the letter of Article 324 and the trust that sustains India's electoral democracy.

(~325 words)

Sources: 1. Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India, 2023 INSC 190 (Supreme Court of India) — Constitution Bench ruling and interim PM–LoP–CJI committee till Parliament legislates 2. PRS Legislative Research — CEC and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Bill, 2023 — Selection Committee composition; Cabinet Secretary-headed Search Committee recommending five names 3. India Code — CEC and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023 — enacted text replacing the 1991 Act