The Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023 has been criticised as undermining the independence of the Election Commission of India. Critically examine.

Q. The Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023 has been criticised as undermining the independence of the Election Commission of India. Critically examine. (15 marks, 250-350 words)

Article 324 vests superintendence of elections in the ECI, but for seven decades no law governed who staffed it. The 2023 Act finally fills that vacuum under Article 324(2) [3]; the criticism is not that it legislates, but that it re-centres appointment power in the executive.

Why the Act is seen as undermining independence - Built-in executive majority: the Selection Committee of Prime Minister, a Union Cabinet Minister and the Leader of Opposition gives the ruling party two of three votes, so the LoP can dissent but never block [2]. - CJI displaced: the neutral third member of the Supreme Court's interim mechanism in Anoop Baranwal (2023) was replaced by a Minister, restoring the pre-2023 balance in statutory form [2]. - Executive-controlled shortlisting: the panel of five is prepared by a Search Committee headed by the Law Minister, and the Selection Committee may even go beyond that panel [1]. - Narrow eligibility: confining candidates to those of Secretary-rank in the Union Government limits the pool to serving or retired officers of the very executive being regulated [2]. - Asymmetric security of tenure: an EC is removable on the CEC's recommendation, while only the CEC enjoys Supreme Court-judge-level protection [2].

The other side of the balance - It ends an unregulated regime of appointment on the Prime Minister's sole advice, replacing convention with written law and stated qualifications of integrity and election-management experience [2]. - Parliament, not the Court, is the constitutionally designated law-maker here; placing the CJI in an executive appointment also strains separation of powers and pre-commits the judge who must later adjudicate election disputes. - Fixed six-year/65-year tenure with a bar on re-appointment removes the incentive of post-retirement favour [2].

The Act's procedural gains are real, but independence rests on who decides, not merely on codification. A broader, plurality-based committee — adding a non-partisan constitutional functionary and requiring reasoned, published selections — would align the law with the free and fair elections that form the Constitution's basic promise. The matter's pendency before the Supreme Court makes such recalibration timely rather than adversarial.

(~330 words)

Sources: 1. PIB, Press Release on the CEC and Other ECs (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023 — Search Committee headed by the Law Minister, panel of five, Selection Committee's power to look beyond the panel 2. PRS Legislative Research, The CEC and Other ECs (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Bill, 2023 — Selection Committee composition and executive majority, replacement of the CJI, Secretary-rank eligibility, six-year/65-year tenure and bar on re-appointment, asymmetric removal 3. India Code, The CEC and Other ECs (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023 (Act No. 49 of 2023) — statutory basis of the appointment framework under Article 324(2)