The Supreme Court's intervention in executive appointments to constitutional bodies raises fundamental questions about separation of powers in India. Discuss with reference to the Anoop Baranwal judgment.

Q. The Supreme Court's intervention in executive appointments to constitutional bodies raises fundamental questions about separation of powers in India. (15 marks, 250-350 words)

Article 324(2) vests appointment of the Chief Election Commissioner and Election Commissioners in the President, "subject to any law made by Parliament". For seven decades no such law existed, and in Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India (2023) a five-judge Constitution Bench stepped into that vacuum [1] — an intervention that is best read not as judicial overreach but as a corrective for legislative default.

Why the Court intervened - The Bench held that appointment on the sole advice of the executive left the ECI structurally vulnerable, since the party in power has an interest in perpetuating itself [1]. - Free and fair elections were treated as part of the constitutional core, making ECI independence a justiciable concern, not merely a policy choice [1]. - The remedy was expressly interim: a PM–Leader of Opposition–CJI committee, operative only "till Parliament makes a law" [1].

The separation-of-powers questions it raises - Judicial law-making: can courts design an appointment mechanism, a function textually assigned to Parliament? The Court's answer was necessity — a vacuum, not a vacancy of power. - Judges in executive functions: placing the CJI on a selection committee blurs the very separation being defended, echoing debates around the collegium and the NJAC judgment (2015). - Legislative supremacy: Parliament's 2023 Act replaced the CJI with a Union Cabinet Minister nominated by the PM, with a Cabinet Secretary-headed Search Committee shortlisting names [2][3], restoring an executive majority of two in three. - Judicial review of legislative intent: the pending challenge, where the Court has asked whether the judgment's ethos was debated in Parliament [4], tests how far courts may probe legislative deliberation.

Separation of powers in India has never meant watertight compartments; it means each organ checking the others without displacing them. The durable solution is a statutory framework that is genuinely bipartisan and transparent — a neutral third member, published criteria, and reasoned recommendations — so that the ECI's credibility rests on institutional design rather than on periodic judicial rescue.

(~325 words)

Sources: 1. Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India, 2023 INSC 190 (Supreme Court Constitution Bench) — constitutional vacuum in appointments, free and fair elections rationale, interim PM–LoP–CJI committee 2. The CEC and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Bill, 2023 — PRS Legislative Research — Selection Committee composition, Cabinet Secretary-headed Search Committee 3. The CEC and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023 — India Code — enacted statutory framework replacing the 1991 Act 4. "Was a 'proper debate' held in Parliament on CEC and ECs appointment law, asks SC" — The Hindu, 8 May 2026 (link not verifiable; publisher blocks automated access) — pending challenge and the Court's query on parliamentary debate