The Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023 was intended to institutionalise the appointment process. Has it succeeded in protecting the independence of the Election Commission? Analyse.

Article 324(2) left CEC/EC appointment "subject to any law made by Parliament" — a gap filled only in 2023, after the Supreme Court in Anoop Baranwal (2023) mandated an interim PM–LoP–CJI panel. The Act ends the era of pure executive discretion, yet its design leaves the Commission's independence only partly secured.

Where it institutionalises

• Statutory selection process: a Search Committee headed by the Cabinet Secretary shortlists five names for the Selection Committee — replacing an opaque seniority convention with a recorded procedure [1].
• Fixed, non-renewable tenure: six years or age 65, with no reappointment, and a bar on an EC's combined service exceeding six years — removing the incentive to please the appointing authority for a second term [1].
• Formal Opposition presence: the Leader of Opposition in Lok Sabha sits on the Selection Committee for the first time by statute [1].

Where independence remains exposed

• Executive majority in selection: PM + a Union Cabinet Minister outvote the LoP 2:1; substituting the Minister for the CJI dilutes the Baranwal rationale of a neutral third voice [1].
• Status downgrade: salary and service conditions pegged to the Cabinet Secretary rather than a Supreme Court judge, as under the 1991 Act — symbolically subordinating a constitutional authority to the bureaucracy [1].
• Asymmetric security of tenure: only the CEC enjoys Article 324(5) protection (removal like a Supreme Court judge, requiring 100 LS or 50 RS signatures and a special majority in both Houses); ECs are removable on the CEC's recommendation [2][3].
• Credibility test in practice: the removal notice moved against the incumbent CEC in March 2026 over the Special Intensive Revision shows that procedural legitimacy has not translated into perceived neutrality [4].

The Act is a necessary first step, not a sufficient one: it institutionalises how commissioners are chosen without insulating who chooses them. Restoring a neutral member to the Selection Committee, extending Article 324(5) protection to all Commissioners, and granting the ECI an independent secretariat would align the law with the constitutional promise of free and fair elections.