The Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023 was intended to institutionalise the appointment process. Has it succeeded in protecting the independence of the Election Commission? Analyse.

Q. The Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023 was intended to institutionalise the appointment process. Has it succeeded in protecting the independence of the Election Commission? (15 marks, 250-350 words)

The 2023 Act was Parliament's answer to the Supreme Court's ruling that appointing Election Commissioners by executive fiat alone endangered the mandate of Article 324 [1]. It replaced convention with statute — but codifying a process is not the same as insulating an institution.

What the Act did institutionalise - A statutory Selection Committee — Prime Minister, a Union Cabinet Minister, and the Leader of Opposition in Lok Sabha — displacing unwritten executive discretion [1]. - A Search Committee headed by the Cabinet Secretary shortlisting five names, with eligibility fixed at Secretary rank plus election-management experience [1]. - A fixed tenure of six years or age 65, with no reappointment, closing the door on post-retirement bargaining [1].

Where independence remains unprotected - Structural executive majority: the PM and a Cabinet Minister can outvote the LoP; the Chief Justice of India, whom the Court had placed on the panel, was substituted out [1]. - Recommendations remain valid despite a vacancy in the Committee — permitting appointment even without the Opposition's presence [1]. - Status was downgraded from Supreme Court judge to Cabinet Secretary, diluting the parity that underlies the judge-like protection of Article 324(5) [1]. - The Act is silent on removal; only the CEC enjoys judge-like security, other Commissioners being removable on the CEC's recommendation [2].

The framework under stress - The Special Intensive Revision of rolls, conducted under Article 324 and the Representation of the People Act, 1950 with stated safeguards [3], nonetheless drew sustained allegations of partisanship. - The first-ever removal notice against a sitting CEC (March 2026) exposed the accountability gap: the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 route [4] requires 100 Lok Sabha or 50 Rajya Sabha signatures and then a special majority in both Houses [2] — procedurally near-unattainable.

The Act has institutionalised the form of appointment without securing its substance. Restoring a neutral third member, extending Article 324(5) protection to all Commissioners, and clarifying removal would convert statutory process into genuine autonomy — indispensable, since free and fair elections rest on a Commission that is trusted by winners and losers alike.

(~330 words)

Sources: 1. The Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Bill, 2023 — PRS Legislative Research — Selection and Search Committee composition, vacancy clause, six-year/65-year tenure, Cabinet Secretary-level salary, Supreme Court's prior ruling 2. Explainer: Removal of Judges from Office — PRS Legislative Research — 100 Lok Sabha / 50 Rajya Sabha signature threshold, inquiry committee, special-majority requirement applicable to the CEC via Article 324(5) 3. ECI's Special Intensive Revision of Electoral Rolls Being Conducted in Phases with Multiple Safeguards — PIB — SIR ordered under Article 324 and the Representation of the People Act, 1950, with stated safeguards 4. The Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 — India Code — procedural statute governing inquiry into removal