Examine the constitutional provisions that protect the Election Commission of India from executive interference. In light of recent controversies, how can the ECI's institutional independence be further strengthened?

Q. Examine the constitutional provisions that protect the Election Commission of India from executive interference. In light of recent controversies, how can the ECI's institutional independence be further strengthened? (15 marks, 250-350 words)

Article 324 vests the superintendence, direction and control of elections in the Election Commission of India (ECI) as an independent constitutional authority. Yet the recent removal notice moved against the Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) and disputes over intensive revision of electoral rolls show that textual safeguards alone do not guarantee autonomy.

Constitutional shield against executive interference - Security of tenure: Article 324(5) bars removal of the CEC except in the like manner and on the like grounds as a Supreme Court judge — a presidential order after an address by both Houses, each passing it by a majority of total membership and two-thirds of members present and voting [1]. - Procedural rigour: the process is routed through the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968, requiring a signed notice by 100 Lok Sabha or 50 Rajya Sabha members and a three-member inquiry committee before any motion is debated [1][2]. - Protected service conditions: the conditions of service of the CEC cannot be varied to his disadvantage after appointment. - Institutional support: Article 324(6) obliges the Union and States to make available staff for the discharge of the Commission's functions.

Persisting gaps - Other Election Commissioners lack equal protection — they are removable on the CEC's recommendation, leaving a majority of the Commission exposed. - The 2023 Act's Selection Committee (PM, a Union Cabinet Minister, Leader of Opposition) replaced the Chief Justice of India mandated in Anoop Baranwal, giving the executive an inbuilt majority [3]. - Salaries were pegged to the Cabinet Secretary, fixed by government, rather than to a Supreme Court judge, fixed by Parliament [3].

Strengthening independence - Restore a neutral appointing authority by including the CJI or an eminent jurist in the Selection Committee. - Extend Article 324(5) tenure protection to all Election Commissioners. - Provide the ECI an independent secretariat and a charged expenditure on the Consolidated Fund. - Codify transparent norms for roll revision, with reasoned public disclosure of deletions.

An election body's authority rests on perceived impartiality as much as on legal insulation. Institutionalising consultative appointments and financial autonomy — consistent with the Dinesh Goswami and Second ARC recommendations — would convert the constitutional promise of Article 324 into durable practice, deepening the free and fair elections that form part of the basic structure.

(~325 words)

Sources: 1. Explainer: Removal of Judges from Office — PRS Legislative Research — signature thresholds and special-majority requirement applied to CEC removal 2. The Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 — India Code — inquiry-committee procedure governing removal 3. The Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Bill, 2023 — PRS Legislative Research — Selection Committee composition and salary pegged to Cabinet Secretary