The removal procedure for the Chief Election Commissioner as prescribed under Article 324(5) and the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 is both a safeguard and a paradox. Critically examine.

Q. The removal procedure for the Chief Election Commissioner as prescribed under Article 324(5) and the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 is both a safeguard and a paradox. Critically examine. (15 marks, 250-350 words)

Article 324(5) provides that the Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) shall not be removed except in the like manner and on the like grounds as a Judge of the Supreme Court, with the procedure elaborated in the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 [1][2]. This borrowed judicial shield secures the Election Commission's independence, yet its very rigidity raises questions of accountability — as the removal notice submitted against the incumbent CEC in March 2026 illustrates.

As a safeguard for institutional independence - Security of tenure: removal requires a Presidential order following an address by both Houses in the same session, passed by a majority of total membership and two-thirds of members present and voting [1] — insulating the CEC from a displeased executive. - Due process: a motion needs 100 Lok Sabha or 50 Rajya Sabha members, and if admitted, a three-member inquiry committee frames charges and permits written defence, barring removal on mere allegation [1]. - Functional autonomy: this protection underpins the ECI's plenary powers of superintendence and control over elections under Article 324(1), enabling assertiveness against ruling parties, as in the Seshan years.

The paradox it creates - Accountability deficit: "proven misbehaviour or incapacity" is undefined [1]; no judge has ever been removed, making the bar practically unattainable and the safeguard near-absolute. - Asymmetric protection: other Election Commissioners lack this shield, being removable on the CEC's recommendation — weakening the collegial character of a multi-member body. - Front-end vulnerability: the CEC and Other Election Commissioners Act, 2023 vests selection in a committee of the Prime Minister, a Union Minister and the Leader of Opposition [3] — an executive-dominant entry gate that no exit-gate rigidity can cure. - Politicisation risk: removal notices become instruments of protest rather than adjudication, eroding credibility without resolving grievances.

The paradox lies in protecting the office while leaving the officeholder's selection and conduct largely unpoliced. A genuinely bipartisan selection committee, a codified conduct standard, and extension of Article 324(5) protection to all Commissioners would align the ECI with the constitutional promise of free and fair elections under Article 324.

(~330 words)

Sources: 1. PRS Legislative Research — Explainer: Removal of Judges from Office — grounds, MP-signature thresholds, three-member inquiry committee, special-majority requirement 2. India Code — The Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 (Act 51 of 1968) — statutory procedure governing the inquiry 3. PRS Legislative Research — The CEC and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Bill, 2023 — composition of the Selection Committee