Examine the constitutional validity of the Lok Sabha Speaker constituting a judge-inquiry committee unilaterally when the Rajya Sabha Deputy Chairman has rejected the corresponding motion in the Upper House.

Q. Examine the constitutional validity of the Lok Sabha Speaker constituting a judge-inquiry committee unilaterally when the Rajya Sabha Deputy Chairman has rejected the corresponding motion in the Upper House. (15 marks, 250-350 words)

Article 124(4), read with Articles 217(1)(b) and 218, makes judicial removal a parliamentary function on grounds of proved misbehaviour or incapacity, with the procedure regulated by the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 [1][2]. The Speaker's unilateral constitution of the Justice Varma inquiry committee on 12 August 2025 [3], after the Upper House motion fell, appears statutorily sustainable, though it exposes a genuine drafting gap.

The statutory scheme - Section 3(2) requires a three-member committee — a Supreme Court judge, a High Court Chief Justice and a distinguished jurist [2][3]. - The first proviso mandates joint constitution by the Speaker and the Chairman where notices are moved on the same day in both Houses and admitted in both. - The second proviso vests the power in the presiding officer of the House where the motion alone stands admitted. - Admission is discretionary: the presiding officer may admit or refuse a notice after preliminary consultation [1].

Grounds supporting validity - Rejection in the Rajya Sabha means no motion was ever admitted there; the condition precedent for joint action failed, activating the second proviso. - Each House acts independently in initiating removal; a joint reading would let one House's refusal veto the other's admitted motion — defeating the Act's purpose. - Article 122 bars courts from questioning parliamentary procedure, which is why the Court signalled reluctance to disturb the Speaker's act.

Unsettled questions - Whether the Deputy Chairman (Article 91) can exercise the Chairman's quasi-judicial power of rejecting a removal motion remains undecided. - Bicameral asymmetry is untested: only the Ramaswami (1993) and Soumitra Sen (2011) proceedings preceded this one, neither on these facts.

The Speaker's action rests on a defensible reading of the second proviso, and judicial restraint under Article 122 reinforces it. Yet an authoritative ruling, and a legislative amendment clarifying bicameral coordination — as the lapsed Judicial Standards and Accountability Bill, 2010 attempted — would secure both judicial independence and parliamentary accountability, the twin values Article 124(4) seeks to balance.

(~330 words)

Sources: 1. PRS Legislative Research, "Explainer: How a Sitting Judge Can Be Removed From Office" — removal procedure, presiding officer's discretion to admit or refuse a motion, special majority requirement 2. The Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 (Act No. 51 of 1968), full text — Section 3(2) and its provisos on committee composition and constituting authority 3. PIB, "Judges Inquiry Committee Submits Report to Hon'ble Speaker, Lok Sabha" — committee constituted by the Speaker on 12 August 2025; three-member composition 4. The Constitution of India, Legislative Department — Articles 91, 122, 124(4), 217(1)(b) and 218