The in-house mechanism for judicial accountability has often proved inadequate. In light of recent developments, assess the case for a statutory, independent judicial accountability commission in India.

Q. The in-house mechanism for judicial accountability has often proved inadequate. In light of recent developments, assess the case for a statutory, independent judicial accountability commission in India. (15 marks, 250-350 words)

The Constitution provides only one route to discipline higher-judiciary judges — removal under Art. 124(4) (and Art. 217(1)(b) with Art. 218) for "proved misbehaviour or incapacity" — leaving everything short of removal to the Supreme Court's in-house procedure devised by the Full Court in 1999 [1]. Recent events suggest this binary is insufficient, though a commission is no automatic remedy.

Inadequacy of the in-house mechanism - No statutory basis: it rests on a Full Court resolution, and the Court itself has clarified it is not a removal mechanism [1]. - Opacity: proceedings are treated as wholly confidential, with reports rarely published, weakening deterrence and public trust. - No graded sanctions: the CJI can, at most, advise resignation or withdraw judicial work — as seen in the 2025 cash-at-residence allegations against Justice Yashwant Varma, where adverse in-house findings could only be escalated to Parliament.

Limits of the parliamentary route - Requires 100 Lok Sabha or 50 Rajya Sabha signatures and a special majority in both Houses — no judge has ever been removed [3]; Justice Ramaswami (1993) survived on party abstentions, Justice Soumitra Sen (2011) resigned mid-process. - Procedural ambiguity: Section 3(2) of the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 requires the Speaker and Chairman to act jointly when motions come on the same day [2] — a question now litigated before the Supreme Court in the Varma matter. - Numbers, not merit, decide outcomes — accountability becomes hostage to floor arithmetic.

The case for a statutory commission — and its caveats - The lapsed Judicial Standards and Accountability Bill, 2010 offered a template: a National Judicial Oversight Committee, a Complaints Scrutiny Panel, citizen complaints, asset declaration and minor penalties short of removal [4]. - Caveat: post-NJAC (2015), any body with executive dominance risks violating judicial independence as basic structure; frivolous complaints could chill judicial courage.

A calibrated, judiciary-majority statutory commission — filling the gap between silence and impeachment — best reconciles independence with accountability. Reviving the 2010 Bill with transparent reporting and safeguards against vexatious complaints would strengthen, not subordinate, the judiciary's constitutional authority.

(~330 words)

Sources: 1. PRS Legislative Research, "Explainer: Mechanisms to investigate charges against a Supreme Court judge" — 1999 in-house procedure, its scope and confidentiality 2. The Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 (Act 51 of 1968), PRS text — Section 3(2) three-member committee and joint Speaker–Chairman proviso 3. PRS Legislative Research, "Explainer: How a Sitting Judge Can Be Removed From Office" — signature threshold, special majority, no judge removed to date 4. The Judicial Standards and Accountability Bill, 2010 — PRS Bill Track — Oversight Committee, Scrutiny Panel, asset declaration, minor penalties