The Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 places the inquiry process at the intersection of judicial independence and parliamentary supremacy. Critically examine the procedural safeguards and loopholes exposed by the Justice Varma case.

Q. The Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 places the inquiry process at the intersection of judicial independence and parliamentary supremacy. Critically examine the procedural safeguards and loopholes exposed by the Justice Varma case. (15 marks, 250-350 words)

The Constitution fixes only the ground for removing a judge — "proved misbehaviour or incapacity" under Art. 124(4) for Supreme Court judges and Art. 217(1)(b) read with Art. 218 for High Court judges — while the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 supplies the procedure [1][2]. The Justice Varma proceedings, only the third to reach the committee stage, show that this design protects judges well but leaves the parliamentary end under-specified.

Procedural safeguards that worked - Peer-dominated inquiry: the committee under Section 3(2) comprises a Supreme Court judge, a High Court Chief Justice and a distinguished jurist — insulating fact-finding from political majorities [1][2]. - Due process for the judge: charges must be framed and served, with a written defence and civil-court-like evidence procedure, before any finding [1]. - High voting threshold: removal needs a special majority in each House — majority of total membership plus two-thirds of those present and voting — preventing partisan ouster [1]. - Judicial restraint: the Supreme Court's prima facie disagreement with the challenge to the Speaker's action reflects settled reluctance to police parliamentary procedure (Art. 122) [3].

Loopholes exposed - Bicameral asymmetry: motions were moved in both Houses on the same day, but the Rajya Sabha notice was rejected while the Lok Sabha admitted its motion — the Act nowhere resolves such divergence [3]. - Unilateral constitution: the first proviso to Section 3(2) mandates a joint Speaker–Chairman committee for same-day motions; the Speaker acted alone, leaving validity to turn on whether rejection equals non-admission [1][3]. - Presiding-officer powers undefined: whether a Deputy Chairman (Art. 91) may exercise quasi-judicial powers of admission is unsettled [3]. - Two parallel tracks: the Court's informal in-house mechanism and the statutory route operate without codified linkage.

The Act's judicial safeguards are robust; its parliamentary machinery is not. Codifying the same-day-motion procedure and reviving the accountability framework once proposed in the Judicial Standards and Accountability Bill, 2010 [4] would let accountability and independence reinforce, rather than obstruct, each other.

(~330 words)

Sources: 1. Explainer: How a Sitting Judge Can Be Removed From Office — PRS Legislative Research — removal grounds, three-member committee, charge-framing and defence, special majority 2. The Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 — India Code, Ministry of Law and Justice — Section 3 composition, committee powers and inquiry procedure 3. "SC in 'disagreement' with Justice Varma's claims on LS Speaker", The Hindu, 8 January 2026 (news report; link not verifiable) — same-day motions, Rajya Sabha rejection, Speaker's unilateral constitution, Deputy Chairman's powers, Court's prima facie view 4. The Judicial Standards and Accountability Bill, 2010 — PRS Legislative Research — proposed statutory accountability framework as reform reference