Examine the order of preference recommended by the Sarkaria Commission and Punchhi Commission for appointment of a Chief Minister in a hung assembly. How far have Governors adhered to these guidelines in practice?

Article 164(1) vests the appointment of the Chief Minister in the Governor but is silent on the criteria to be applied when no party wins a majority. The Sarkaria Commission (1987) and the Punchhi Commission (2010) filled this constitutional gap with an order of preference — a convention that has been followed selectively rather than consistently.

The recommended order of preference

• Pre-poll alliance commanding a majority — its leader is invited first [1][2].
• Single largest party staking a claim with outside support — placed above post-poll arrangements [1].
• Post-poll coalition in which all partners join the government [2].
• Post-poll alliance where some partners are in the cabinet and others support from outside [2].
• Safeguards: an early floor test as the sole proof of majority, a Governor who is an outsider not recently active in politics, and a secure tenure insulated from Union pleasure [2][4].

Adherence in practice — the positive record

• Tamil Nadu (2026): TVK, the single largest party with 108 of 234 seats, produced letters of support from 120 MLAs; Governor Arlekar invited C. Joseph Vijay and directed a confidence vote within days — the preference order plus floor-test discipline applied together [3].
• In clear-majority verdicts the appointment remains mechanical and uncontested.

Where Governors have deviated

• Oath administered before numbers were demonstrated (Karnataka, 2018), compelling the Supreme Court to compress the floor test.
• In Subhash Desai (2023) the Court held the Maharashtra Governor's floor-test call lacked objective material, restating that discretion cannot destabilise an elected government.
• Because the guidelines are advisory, not statutory, PRS notes that most such recommendations remain unimplemented, the floor-test rule surviving only because the judiciary mandated it [4].

Adherence has therefore been partial and largely judicially enforced rather than voluntary. Codifying the order of preference in Rules of Business, prescribing a time-bound floor test, and adopting Punchhi's fixed tenure and impartial removal process would convert a contested discretion into a predictable constitutional duty, strengthening cooperative federalism.