*Recent episodes involving Governors of several states have reignited debate on the constitutional role of Governors. Discuss the challenges to cooperative federalism posed by the Governor's office.*

Q. Recent episodes involving Governors of several states have reignited debate on the constitutional role of Governors. Discuss the challenges to cooperative federalism posed by the Governor's office. (15 marks, 250-350 words)

Article 163 makes the Governor a constitutional head bound by ministerial advice except where the Constitution expressly permits discretion. Recurring disputes over government formation and assent to Bills have converted this narrow discretion into a persistent fault line in Centre–State relations.

Structural dependence on the Union - Appointed by the President on the Union Cabinet's advice (Article 155) and holding office during pleasure (Article 156), the Governor lacks tenure security, inviting the charge of acting as the Centre's agent. - The Sarkaria Commission urged a non-partisan appointee, chosen after consulting the Chief Minister [1]; the Punchhi Commission added a fixed five-year tenure removable only through an impartial process [2]. Most such recommendations remain unimplemented [3].

Discretion in government formation - Article 164(1) prescribes no criteria for a hung Assembly; only commission guidelines fill the gap, ranking pre-poll alliances above single largest parties and post-poll coalitions [1][2]. - Tamil Nadu (2026) illustrates both sides: TVK won 108 of 234 seats [4] and was invited after producing support of 120 MLAs — yet Raj Bhavan has no machinery to verify such letters, and swearing-in before a floor test (Karnataka, 2018) breeds distrust. S.R. Bommai (1994) settled that the floor of the House is the sole test of majority.

Legislative and administrative friction - Governors in Kerala, Punjab and Tamil Nadu withheld action on Bills for long periods; Punchhi recommended a time-bound decision on assent [2], and the resulting litigation has left the question substantially political rather than judicially fixable [3]. - The Governor's report under Article 356, though judicially reviewable post-Bommai, and roles such as university Chancellor, extend the friction into everyday administration [3].

The office is thus not inherently anti-federal; its discretion becomes contentious only where selection and tenure are politically contingent. Implementing the Sarkaria–Punchhi safeguards — consultative appointment, fixed tenure, timelines for assent, and a floor test as the invariable rule — would restore the Governor to a bridge between Union and State, advancing the constitutional promise of cooperative federalism.

(~330 words)

Sources: 1. Report of the Sarkaria Commission on Centre-State Relations, Chapter IV: Role of the Governor (1988) — appointment norms and order of preference for inviting a Chief Minister 2. Report of the Commission on Centre-State Relations (Punchhi Commission), Vol. II: Constitutional Governance (2010) — fixed tenure, impartial removal, time-bound assent to Bills 3. PRS Legislative Research, "Governor versus state: Why tensions are rising again" — delays on Bills, Article 356 trends post-Bommai, non-implementation of commission recommendations 4. Election Commission of India, Party-wise Result, Tamil Nadu General Election to Legislative Assembly, May 2026 — TVK's 108 seats in a 234-member House