Does reliance on inherent constitutional powers (Article 129) over statutory procedure (1971 Act) undermine due process safeguards in contempt cases? Discuss.

Q. Does reliance on inherent constitutional powers (Article 129) over statutory procedure (1971 Act) undermine due process safeguards in contempt cases? (15 marks, 250-350 words)

Article 129 makes the Supreme Court a court of record with inherent power to punish contempt of itself; the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 supplies the procedure for exercising it [1][2]. Reliance on the constitutional source does strain due process, but statutory and judicial safeguards have largely contained the risk.

Why the constitutional power sits above the statute - The power flows directly from Articles 129 and 215 and cannot be curtailed by ordinary legislation; the 1971 Act regulates, but does not create, it [1][2]. - Consequently, the requirement of Attorney-General/Solicitor-General consent for private criminal-contempt petitions — Section 15 read with Rule 3 of the 1975 Rules — does not fetter suo motu action by the Court itself [3].

Due process concerns - Fusion of roles: the offended court may act as complainant, prosecutor and judge, straining nemo judex in causa sua and the fair-trial guarantee under Article 21. - Bypass of statutory limits: the one-year limitation (Section 20), the punishment ceiling (Section 12) and appeal rights (Section 19) risk being read as advisory rather than binding [2]. - Vagueness: "scandalising the court" in Section 2(c) is elastic and can chill legitimate criticism protected by Article 19(1)(a) [2]. - Summary procedure compresses notice, charge and defence into a single sitting.

Countervailing safeguards - In Pallav Sheth v. Custodian (2001), the Court held that inherent power must still be exercised consistently with statutory safeguards, including Section 20 [4]. - Section 13 bars punishment unless justice is substantially interfered with, and since 2006 admits truth as a defence alongside fair criticism [2]. - The Law Commission's 274th Report found these built-in safeguards sufficient and advised against amendment [5]. - Discretion itself restrains: in July 2026 a Bench declined contempt against a petitioner-in-person who hurled papers at it, citing his condition — the power is discretionary, not automatic.

Article 129 thus supplements rather than supplants due process; the risk lies in unstructured exercise, not in the power. Codified norms for suo motu initiation, hearing by an unaffected Bench, and sparing use confined to genuine obstruction of justice would reconcile judicial dignity with Articles 14, 19 and 21.

(~320 words)

Sources: 1. The Constitution of India, Articles 129 and 215 (India Code) — Supreme Court/High Courts as courts of record with inherent contempt power 2. The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (Act 70 of 1971), India Code — Sections 2(c), 12, 13, 15, 19 and 20; truth as a defence after the 2006 amendment 3. Rules to Regulate Proceedings for Contempt of the Supreme Court, 1975 — Rule 3 consent of Attorney-General/Solicitor-General for private criminal contempt 4. Pallav Sheth v. Custodian & Ors. (Supreme Court, 10 August 2001) — inherent contempt power to be exercised consistently with the Act's limitation safeguard 5. PRS Legislative Research summary, Law Commission Report No. 274: Review of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 — recommendation against amendment; existing statutory safeguards held adequate