"The replacement of Section 124A IPC with Section 152 BNS represents a change in nomenclature rather than substance." Critically examine in the context of free speech jurisprudence in India.

Section 124A IPC, inserted in 1870 and used against Tilak and Gandhi, was upheld in Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar (1962) only when speech had a tendency to incite violence or public disorder [1], and was kept in abeyance by the Supreme Court in May 2022 [1]. Section 152 BNS, in force from July 1, 2024, renames the offence but only partly renews it.

Continuity — the case for "nomenclature alone"

• Speech remains the target: words, signs, visible representation and electronic communication still constitute the actus reus [3].
• Vague terms persist: "subversive activities" and "feelings of separatist activities" are undefined, reproducing the open-endedness of "disaffection" [2].
• Chilling effect intact: the offence stays cognisable and non-bailable, with punishment raised to seven years or life — process itself becomes punishment [3].
• The Law Commission's 279th Report had urged retention with enhanced punishment, showing legislative intent was reform of form, not abolition [1].

Change — the case for substance

• Shift of constitutional peg: from "public order" to sovereignty, unity and integrity under Article 19(2) — a distinct restriction.
• Loyalty no longer demanded: mere disaffection or contempt towards government is not an offence; criticism of the State is decriminalised in terms.
• Kedar Nath safeguard textualised: the provision requires excitement of secession, armed rebellion or endangerment of sovereignty, closer to an incitement standard.

A calibrated verdict The claim holds substantially but not wholly: the label has changed and the "loyalty to government" core has gone, yet vagueness plus wider punishment may broaden reach beyond the 1962 narrowing [2].

The real test of Section 152 will lie not in its drafting but in its policing. Judicially reading the Kedar Nath incitement test into "subversive activities", mandating sanction before FIRs, and training police on the free-speech threshold would align the provision with Article 19(1)(a) and the constitutional promise of reasoned dissent.