The SHANTI Act, 2025 marks a paradigm shift in India's nuclear energy governance. Analyse its potential benefits and risks in the context of India's energy security and safety obligations.

Q. The SHANTI Act, 2025 marks a paradigm shift in India's nuclear energy governance. Analyse its potential benefits and risks in the context of India's energy security and safety obligations. (15 marks, 250-350 words)

The SHANTI (Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement of Nuclear Energy for Transforming India) Act, 2025 replaces both the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 and the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010, ending the state monopoly over nuclear generation [1]. The shift is threefold — in ownership, liability and regulation — and its promise for energy security is real, but conditional on regulatory capacity.

The nature of the shift - Ownership: licences may now be granted to Indian private companies and government–private joint ventures to build, own and operate plants, diluting NPCIL's exclusivity; companies incorporated outside India remain barred [1]. - Liability: the flat ₹1,500 crore operator cap gives way to a graded structure of ₹100–3,000 crore linked to reactor capacity [1]. - Regulation: the AERB receives statutory status for the first time, replacing its executive-order basis [1].

Potential benefits - Capacity and energy security: India's installed nuclear capacity is about 8,180 MW, targeted to reach 22,480 MW by 2031-32 [2]; private capital is essential to the Nuclear Energy Mission's 100 GW-by-2047 goal [3]. - Clean-energy transition: firm, low-carbon baseload supports the net-zero-by-2070 pledge, reducing import dependence on coal and crude [3]. - Technology diffusion: the ₹20,000 crore SMR programme gains private design and execution capacity [3]. - Accountability: a statutory regulator strengthens India's safety obligations under international practice [1].

Attendant risks - Regulatory capture: AERB remains appointed by the Central Government, which also promotes nuclear power — an unresolved conflict of interest [1]. - Under-compensation: lower liability tiers may prove inadequate against catastrophic damage, shifting residual costs to the exchequer [1]. - Commercial pressure on safety, plus unsettled questions of land acquisition and public consent at new sites.

The Act correctly recognises that state finances alone cannot deliver 100 GW. Its success now depends on operationalising an independent, adequately staffed AERB and transparent licensing, so that liberalisation of capital does not become dilution of safety — the precondition for nuclear energy to anchor a secure, decarbonised Viksit Bharat.

(~330 words)

Sources: 1. The Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement of Nuclear Energy for Transforming India Bill, 2025 — PRS Legislative Research — repeal of the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 and CLND Act, 2010; private/JV licensing and bar on foreign-incorporated companies; ₹100–3,000 crore graded liability; statutory AERB and its appointment structure 2. Parliament Question: Enhancing Nuclear Power Capacity — PIB — installed capacity of 8,180 MW and the 22,480 MW target by 2031-32 3. Nuclear Power in Union Budget 2025-26, Department of Atomic Energy — PIB — Nuclear Energy Mission, 100 GW by 2047, ₹20,000 crore SMR outlay and net-zero-by-2070 linkage