‘Dhurandhar: The Revenge’ and the perils of ‘nationalist’ violence

1. At a Glance

• 'Dhurandhar: The Revenge' (released 19 March 2026, dir. Aditya Dhar) is a Hindi spy-action sequel that grossed ₹1,800 crore+ worldwide, making it the second-highest-grossing Indian film of all time. [1]
• The film sparked a sharp critical debate about Bollywood's turn toward overt partisan propaganda — explicitly endorsing ruling-party politics, not merely state/military pride. [2]
• Relevant for UPSC because it sits at the intersection of democracy, media, freedom of expression, soft power, and the sociology of nationalism — all GS-I / GS-II / GS-IV themes.
• Represents a broader decade-long trend of commercially dominant 'nationalist' films that critics argue deform democratic culture by fusing citizenship with majoritarian violence. [3]

2. Why in the News

• 19 March 2026: Dhurandhar: The Revenge released worldwide, coinciding with Gudi Padwa / Ugadi / Eid. Massive box-office success combined with unusually explicit political messaging (references to 2014 election oath-taking, demonetisation visuals) triggered op-ed debate. [1]
• 25 March 2026: The Hindu published an analysis by Nissim Mannathukkaren arguing the film constructs a "new Indian citizen" for whom narrowly defined nationalism = primary virtue = indissolubly linked to violence — a threat to democratic culture. [2]
• Part of a recurring news cycle: each major 'patriotic' Bollywood release (2019–2026) prompts renewed debate on media, propaganda, and Hindu nationalism. [3]

3. Background & Evolution

• Precursor tradition: Bollywood always had patriotic films (Mother India 1957, Kranti 1981, Roja 1992) but earlier films did not collapse state identity into a specific ruling party. [3]
• Key shift: post-2014, commercial cinema (not government documentaries) became the primary vehicle; state support (tax exemptions, informal promotion) blurred the public-private line. [3]

4. Core Static Facts

• Film: Dhurandhar: The Revenge | Director: Aditya Dhar | Lead: Ranveer Singh | Antagonist: Arjun Rampal (ISI Major Iqbal) [1][2]
• Release date: 19 March 2026 [1]
• Box office: ₹1,800 crore+ worldwide; highest-grossing A-rated Indian film ever; highest-grossing Hindi-language film domestically [1]
• Genre: Spy action-thriller; sequel/duology finale [1]
• Real-world events referenced in film: Operation Lyari, 2014 Indian general election, 2016 demonetisation [1]
• Certification: A (Adults Only) — notable given its mass commercial reach [1]
• Central Board of Film Certification (CBFC): Statutory body under Cinematograph Act, 1952 (amended 2023) that certifies films; comes under Ministry of Information & Broadcasting [static fact]
• Key analytical concept (Mannathukkaren): Film enables construction of citizen where nationalism = primary virtue + indissolubly linked to violence [2]
• Propaganda type identified: Not pro-state (as in many Hollywood films) but pro-ruling party — collapsing party and state [2]
• Author of The Hindu op-ed: Nissim Mannathukkaren [2]

5. Multi-Dimensional Analysis

Legal / Constitutional

• Article 19(1)(a): Freedom of speech and expression covers cinematic works; Article 19(2) permits reasonable restrictions on grounds of decency, morality, public order, sovereignty/integrity of India.
• Cinematograph Act, 1952 (amended 2023): CBFC can grant/refuse certification; amended act added provisions against film piracy but criticism arose that it did not add checks against incitement embedded in certified content.
• Films like The Kerala Story were challenged in courts for incitement and false claims; SC allowed screening while noting states could maintain public order — illustrating tension between free expression and community harmony. [3]
• BNS (Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita), 2023: Sections on promoting enmity (formerly IPC §153A) and imputations against national integration (formerly IPC §153B) theoretically applicable to films that incite group hatred — rarely invoked against commercial releases.

Social / Democratic

• Critics argue such films reshape civic identity: citizenship premised on majoritarian belonging + willingness for retributive violence, excluding minorities from the moral community. [2]
• Pattern documented: after The Kashmir Files (2022), anti-Muslim slogans raised inside theatres, social media calls to "shoot traitors" — demonstrating film-to-street violence linkage. [3]
• Implications for minority communities (Muslim, Christian): systematically cast as villains/threats, normalising discrimination. [3]
• Media literacy deficit: mass audiences, especially first-generation cinema-goers in small towns, lack tools to distinguish cinematic representation from factual claims. [3]

Historical

• Pre-2014 template: Films like Roja (1992) or Border (1997) had nationalist themes but did not explicitly endorse any party or political figure's decisions (demonetisation, election oath). [3]
• Global parallel: Leni Riefenstahl's Nazi-era films (Triumph of the Will, 1935) — often cited in academic discourse on state-party-cinema fusion; serves as a historical warning on aestheticisation of politics (Walter Benjamin's concept). [2]
• Indian Emergency (1975-77): Doordarshan used as state propaganda tool — but that was explicit state media, not disguised commercial cinema.

Ethical / Governance

• State endorsement of private commercial films (tax exemptions, ministerial praise) raises conflict of interest concerns — public money/policy instrumentalised for partisan gain. [3]
• CBFC's political independence questioned when overtly partisan content is certified without scrutiny while other films face cuts or bans.
• Democratic erosion pathway: When violence is glamorised as nationalist virtue in mass entertainment, it lowers the threshold for accepting real political violence — a documented pattern in authoritarian transitions globally. [2]

Geopolitical / Strategic

• Films routinely depict Pakistan / ISI as singular source of Indian suffering — reinforces public opinion barriers to diplomatic normalisation even when state policy might require it.
• 26/11 Mumbai attacks (2008) repeatedly invoked as origin point — keeps public emotionally anchored to a crisis frame that legitimises hawkish positions. [1]
• Risk: commercial films become soft-power liabilities internationally, complicating India's image as a pluralist democracy. [3]

Scientific / Technological

• Algorithm-driven amplification: OTT platforms (Netflix, Prime, JioCinema) and social media algorithms amplify emotional content; propaganda films gain disproportionate reach beyond theatrical audiences.
• Deepfake/AI risk: Future iterations could generate personalised nationalist content at scale — a governance frontier not yet addressed by Indian regulation.

6. Recent Developments (last 12–18 months)

• December 2025: Dhurandhar (Part 1) released; backlash against "propaganda" labelling; fans defended film. [2]
• 19 March 2026: Dhurandhar: The Revenge (Part 2) released — explicit political messaging including PM oath-taking visual from 2014, demonetisation imagery. [1][2]
• 25 March 2026: Nissim Mannathukkaren's op-ed in The Hindu — framed the film as symptom of a democratic crisis, not merely a cinematic controversy. [2]
• Box-office landmark: Film surpassed existing records to become second-highest-grossing Indian film ever — demonstrating that nationalist content faces no commercial penalty. [1]
• Ongoing: Debate on whether the Cinematograph Act amendment (2023) needs provisions to address content that incites communal/political violence even when fiction-framed. [static]

7. Prelims Hooks

1. Dhurandhar: The Revenge directed by Aditya Dhar, starring Ranveer Singh — released 19 March 2026. [1]
2. Film grossed ₹1,800 crore+ worldwide — second-highest-grossing Indian film of all time. [1]
3. It is the highest-grossing A-rated Indian film of all time. [1]
4. Real events referenced within the film include Operation Lyari, 2014 general election, and 2016 demonetisation. [1]
5. Film certification in India governed by Cinematograph Act, 1952 (amended 2023), administered by CBFC under Ministry of Information & Broadcasting. [static]
6. The Kashmir Files (2022) was made tax-free in multiple BJP-ruled states and publicly praised by the Prime Minister. [3]
7. Article on nationalist violence in films authored by Nissim Mannathukkaren, published in The Hindu, dated 25 March 2026. [2]
8. Key legal provision on promoting enmity between groups — Section 196, BNS 2023 (formerly IPC Section 153A). [static]
9. Article 19(1)(a) guarantees freedom of speech including cinematic expression; Article 19(2) allows restrictions on grounds of public order and sovereignty. [static]
10. Distinction drawn by critics: earlier Bollywood patriotic films = pro-state; post-2014 films = pro-ruling party (collapsing state and party). [2]
11. The Kerala Story (2023) falsely claimed 32,000 Hindu girls from Kerala recruited to ISIS — challenged in courts, screened after SC observation. [3]
12. Walter Benjamin's concept of "aestheticisation of politics" — cited in academic analysis of propaganda cinema. [2]
13. Uri: The Surgical Strike (2019) — first major post-2014 nationalist blockbuster; established hero-villain template. [3]

8. Mains Relevance

GS Papers: Primarily GS-I (Society, Culture), GS-II (Polity — democracy, fundamental rights, role of media), GS-IV (Ethics — values, role of media in democratic society).

Syllabus headings:

• GS-I: Role of women and women's organization, population and associated issues, poverty and developmental issues, urbanisation, their problems and their remedies → social effects of media and culture
• GS-II: Functions and responsibilities of the Union and the States → role of government in regulating mass media; Government policies and interventions for development in various sectors
• GS-IV: Role of civil society → ethics of media representation; manipulation of public opinion

Plausible Mains Questions:

1. "Commercial cinema in India has increasingly blurred the line between the state and the ruling party, with grave implications for democracy." Critically examine with reference to recent Bollywood productions. (GS-II / GS-IV, 250 words)
2. "The valorisation of nationalist violence in popular culture erodes the constitutional values of fraternity and dignity." Analyse in the context of post-2014 Bollywood trends. (GS-I / GS-IV, 250 words)
3. Examine the adequacy of the Cinematograph Act, 1952 and existing penal provisions in addressing content that incites communal hostility while being certified for public exhibition. (GS-II, 250 words)

9. Related Topics to Study Next

10. Common Errors / Trap Areas

1. CBFC ≠ censor board in absolute sense: CBFC certifies, does not ban films outright (banning requires court orders or executive action under public order powers) — aspirants confuse certification with censorship.
2. Cinematograph Act 1952 amended 2023 ≠ new Act: It is an amendment to the 1952 Act, not a standalone statute — year confusion common.
3. IPC §153A → now BNS §196: With BNS replacing IPC from 1 July 2024, the section numbers changed; aspirants citing old IPC numbers in 2024+ context will be technically wrong.
4. 'Propaganda' label: Aspirants may conflate all patriotic/war films as propaganda; the critical distinction is pro-state (depicting national defence) vs. pro-party (depicting specific political decisions/leaders as heroic) — the article's argument hinges on this difference. [2]
5. Box-office success ≠ legal/policy endorsement: The film's commercial record says nothing about its legal status or government certification — do not conflate popularity with official sanction (though the op-ed critiques informal state patronage of other films like The Kashmir Files). [3]