·The Hindu·15 marks·250–350 wordsEconomy

Mis-selling of complex financial products to retail investors needs a stronger investor-protection framework. Examine.

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In this answer
  1. Why mis-selling persists
  2. Gaps in the present framework
  3. Way forward

Mis-selling means selling a product that does not suit the buyer's risk profile, or hiding its risks. The Yes Bank episode shows the danger. Its Additional Tier-1 (AT-1) bonds could be "written down permanently, in full" [2]. A ₹8,415-crore write-off then went through years of litigation before the Supreme Court found it impermissible [1]. India's protection against mis-selling is weak at the point of sale, after the event and across regulators.

Why mis-selling persists

  • Information asymmetry: AT-1 bonds are perpetual and absorb losses, but buyers often see them as safe, deposit-like products. Many retail buyers cannot price write-down or coupon-skip risk [2].
  • Conflict of interest: banks sell products to depositors who already trust them, and staff are often driven by commissions.
  • Fragmented oversight: RBI, SEBI, IRDAI and PFRDA each regulate a different segment. There is no common suitability standard, which allows regulatory arbitrage (e.g., ULIPs vs mutual funds).
  • Slow redress: relief came only through a High Court case and then a Supreme Court appeal [1].

Gaps in the present framework

  • Fixes come after the harm: in 2020 SEBI limited new AT-1 issues to qualified institutional buyers, with a ₹1-crore minimum lot [3]. This protects only future buyers, not people who already held the bonds.
  • The curbs limit who buys AT-1 bonds, not how banks sell them.
  • No law gives a right to compensation for proven mis-selling. Ombudsman schemes mainly deal with service deficiencies.
  • Financial literacy is low, so customers depend on the seller's advice.

Way forward

  • One suitability and "know-your-product" duty across all regulators, as the Sumit Bose Committee (2015) proposed.
  • Separate advice from distribution, extending the model of the SEBI Investment Advisers Regulations, 2013.
  • A Financial Redress Agency, as the FSLRC recommended, for quick, low-cost compensation.
  • Plain-language risk labels, such as the mutual-fund riskometer, for every complex product. Regulators should also run mystery-shopping audits and claw back commissions on mis-sold products.
  • Scale up the National Strategy for Financial Education.

The SEBI curbs dealt with symptoms. The underlying problems of asymmetry, conflicts of interest and missing redress remain. A unified framework with clear seller duties and fast compensation would protect retail investors' trust and still let banks raise risk capital. That supports deeper financial inclusion and the Constitution's commitment to economic justice.

Sources

  1. 1RBI seeks review of SC's Yes Bank AT-1 bond order — Reuters, *The Hindu*, 17 Nov 2026₹8,415-crore AT-1 write-off; Bombay HC set it aside and the Supreme Court upheld that, holding the write-off impermissible
  2. 2RBI Press Release — Draft Yes Bank Ltd. Reconstruction Scheme, 2020AT-1 instruments to "stand written down permanently, in full"
  3. 3SEBI Circular (6 Oct 2020) — Issuance, listing and trading of PNCPS/IPDIs/PDIs (AT-1 instruments)AT-1 issues limited to QIBs; ₹1-crore minimum allotment and trading lot
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